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This paper examines the relationship between audit quality and several measures of spatial competition. Spatial competition is 
measured as the smallest absolute difference in audit fee market shares from an audit firm and its closest competitor. In this paper, 
spatial competition measures are referred to as competitive distances, and they are calculated within the large audit market (Big 4 
only), within the small audit market (non-Big 4 only), and between the large and small audit markets. Audit market competition and 
its effect on audit quality has been an ongoing debate. On one side of the argument, competition may negatively impact audit quality. 
Increased competition leads to higher likelihood of auditor switching, so auditors compete for client retention by showing more 
leniency in their audits and by decreasing audit fees. On the other hand, more competition leads to audit innovations, more efficient 
and effective audits, and higher audit quality. Lastly, competition may not influence audit quality due to the sufficient nature of 
market-based institutional incentives such as litigation risk, reputation loss, and regulatory compliance. Thus, it is unclear the effect 
that audit market competition has on audit quality. This study finds that local-industry competition for both large and small audit firm 
markets does not influence audit quality in the majority of the test settings. This study may be of interest to companies choosing an 
auditor and to regulators, who have expressed concerns over competition and concentration levels within the audit markets. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper studies whether a relationship exists between audit quality and several measures of spatial competition. Audit 
market concentration and lack of audit market competition have been important topics for policy makers and audit market participants 
for over a decade. Regulators have expressed concerns that the consolidated audit market may lead to auditor complacency and to a 
decrease in audit quality (United States Government Accountability Office 2008).  Yet, in its report, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) also states that oligopolistic competition may be sufficient to overcome the downfalls of an audit market dominated by 
Big 4 firms. Academic research has found mixed results when examining tests about regulators’ concerns. Additionally, the GAO 
adopts the stance that little competition exists between large audit firms (Big 4 firms) and small audit firms (non-Big 4 firms) (GAO 
2008). However, recent studies have shown that large audit markets are susceptible to competitive pressures of small audit firms (Bills 
and Stephens 2016; Keune, Mayhew, and Schmidt 2016). In this paper, the results show that within the small audit markets and within 
large audit markets, little evidence exists to support regulators’ concerns about competition and audit quality. Stone (2017) argues that 
the lack of reported null results biases inferences in favor of rejecting the null, and it is more appropriate to conclude that if most 
results are null, then evidence is lacking to support rejecting the null.  
While the large and small audit markets have different characteristics, Bills and Stephens (2016) and Keune et al. (2016) 
provide evidence that at a local level, small audit firms and large audit firms compete on price. Specifically, Bills and Stephens (2016) 
find that large audit firms reduce audit fees more from competitive pressure of small audit firms than from competitive pressure of 
other large audit firms. Moreover, they show that within the small audit market, small audit firms charge higher fees when small audit 
firms compete with large audit firms for market share. Given the different effects of spatial competition on audit fees within these two 
markets, this study examines the small and large audit markets separately to distinguish how competitive pressure within and between 
these audit markets affects audit quality.  
Competition can be measured in different ways (Herfindahl index, leadership, office-client-balance, spatial distance) and at 
different levels (national, local, local-industry). The focus of this paper is spatial competition. Spatial competition derives from spatial 
economics, and it is based on how firms compete relative to their product-space locations within the market (Hotelling 1929; Biscaia 
and Mota 2013).  Spatial competition, also known as spatial distance, is measured as the smallest absolute difference in market shares 
between two companies (competitors). Hereafter, the term competitive distance refers to spatial competition.1 A decrease in 
competitive distance indicates that firms are closer together in market share, and it suggests an increase in competitive pressure. On 
                                                          
1 Previous audit studies have used the term spatial distance as the proxy for spatial competition (Numan and Willekens 2012, 2014; 
Newton, Persellin, Wang, and Wilkins 2015). In this sense, spatial distance is referencing a competitor’s market share (location) 
relative to its closest competitor’s market share (location). Spatial distance can also refer to the geographical distance between two 
competitors such as miles between their two locations. The term competitive distance denotes a competitor’s market share (location) 
relative to their closest competitor’s market share (location) to avoid any confusion with geographical distance.  
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the other hand, an increase in competitive distance signifies that firms are farther apart in market share, and it implies a decrease in 
competitive pressure.   
This measure of competitive distance described above follows Bills and Stephens (2016) by proxying competition as the 
smallest absolute audit fee market share difference between the two closest competitors. Audit fee market share is defined at a local-
industry level (two-digit SIC, MSA) and at a local level (MSA) for the years 2004-2015. The local level is a broader measure, and it 
holds industry effects constant. Note, this measure of competitive distance at a local level is less reliable because auditors tend to 
specialize in industries within an MSA and not just specialize in an MSA (Reichelt and Wang 2010). The local competitive distance 
results are discussed in Section 5. This paper differentiates from prior research on audit quality and spatial competition by calculating 
competitive distances from different angles: large audit firm to large audit firm, small audit firm to small audit firm, and between a 
large audit firm and a small audit firm.  Using these measures, this study tests if a relationship exists between audit quality and each 
measure of competitive distance. 
Audit quality is proxied using three different measures commonly found in audit quality literature: absolute value of 
abnormal accruals, restatements, and going concern opinions. The absolute value of abnormal accruals is a measure of financial 
reporting quality that is used to detect opportunistic earnings management (DeFond and Zhang 2014). The reasoning behind this 
measure is that higher earnings quality (lower absolute value of abnormal accruals) signifies higher audit quality since high quality 
auditors do not tolerate earnings management (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003). The next measure of audit quality is the occurrence 
of restatements, which is a more direct measure of audit quality than abnormal accruals because it signifies that auditors issued an 
unqualified opinion on financial statements that were materially misstated. The last measure of audit quality is going concern 
opinions. A going concern opinion is a form of auditor communication that indicates the auditors believe that substantial doubt exists 
about the client’s ability to continue as a going concern. Going concern opinions are costly to clients; therefore, client managers may 
pressure audit firms to issue clean opinions. Lower issuances of going concern opinions when appropriate is a signal of lower audit 
quality. 
It is unclear what the relationship is between audit quality and competitive distance. The relationship between audit quality 
and competition could be positive: more competition leads to higher audit quality, and less competition leads to lower audit quality. If 
audit firms are driven to differentiate themselves from others, then increasing technology and innovations may improve audit quality. 
When less competition exists, auditors may become complacent and lax in their professional skepticism, which leads to lower audit 
quality. On the other hand, it can also be argued that audit quality and competition are negatively related. More competition is 
associated with lower audit quality, and less competition is related to higher audit quality. More competition leads to higher auditor 
turnover as well as increased pressure to decrease audit fees. Auditors may reduce audit hours to maintain firm profits when fees 
decrease. Additionally, auditors may be more tolerant of client’s earnings management to retain the client. When competition is low, 
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auditors do not face fee pressure, so they have more flexibility in audit hours and audit fees for their budget and contracts. Under this 
setting, since a lower chance of auditor turnover exists, auditors may perform a “watchdog” role and push back on clients that have 
unreasonable estimates, which could signal better audit quality. Lastly, market-based institutional incentives encourage auditors to 
perform their jobs in an independent and professional manner. As such, competition (high or low) would not have an influence on 
audit quality.  
Most of the results indicate that local-industry competitive distance is not related to audit quality measures. Specifically, in 
the large audit market, local-industry competitive distance between large audit firms and local-industry competitive distance between 
a large audit firm and its nearest small audit firm competitor do not influence audit quality as proxied by abnormal accruals, 
restatements, Big R restatements, Little r restatements, and going concern opinions. The only exception is that weak evidence exists of 
a positive relationship between restatements and competitive distance between a large and a small audit firm when the company is an 
accelerated filer.  For the small audit firm sample, some evidence exists of a relationship between local-industry competitive distance 
and audit quality. Findings show that competitive distance between two small audit firms is negatively related to restatements (when a 
company is a non-accelerated filer) and abnormal accruals. Overall, this paper indicates that competition at a local-industry level may 
not impact audit quality as previously thought. 
Additionally, this study tests if local competitive distance (measured between MSA market shares without regard to industry) 
impacts audit quality. Since auditors tend to specialize in industries, the local competitive distance is a less reliable measure of 
competition. In these analyses, some evidence exists that local competition impacts audit quality. For the large audit firm sample, 
evidence suggests that competition between two large audit firms is negatively linked with abnormal accruals, while competition 
between a large audit firm and its nearest small audit firm competitor is positively associated with abnormal accruals and restatements. 
For the small audit firm sample, competitive distance between small audit firms and competitive distance between small audit firms 
and large audit firms are not significantly related to any measures of audit quality.  
Overall, this research paper contributes to the audit literature and may be of interest to several different parties.  First, this 
study delivers further insight into the audit competition literature. The competition literature examines the association between 
competition and audit quality; however, the results are mixed (Kallapur, Sankaraguruswamy, and Zang 2010; Boone, Khurana, and 
Raman 2012; Newton, Wang, and Wilkins 2013; Numan and Willekens 2014; Ettredge, Sherwood, and Sun 2017). Kallapur et al. 
(2010) and Newton et al. (2013) provide evidence that higher concentration (lower competition) is associated with higher audit quality 
(better accrual quality and fewer restatements). On the other hand, Boone et al. (2012) present findings that higher concentration leads 
to lower audit quality (more just meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts). Lastly, Numan and Willekens (2014), a working 
paper, address the issue of competition and audit quality by proxying competition with competitive distances. They find that smaller 
competitive distance (higher competition) is related to lower audit quality (higher abnormal accruals, more restatements, and fewer 
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issuances of going concern opinions). While these audit quality papers examine competition in some form, they do not capture 
competition strictly among large audit firms, strictly among small audit firms, and strictly between large and small audit firms. Thus, 
this paper provides evidence on this topic. This paper may be of interest to regulators and policy makers who are concerned about the 
audit market concentration, competition among audit firms, and audit quality. This research also provides more insight into the small 
audit market behavior since academic research is often limited in this area (Bills and Stephens 2016). Lastly, this study may be of 
interest to companies that are in the process of choosing an auditor by providing evidence whether audit fees reflect the audit quality a 
company receives.  
The paper continues as follows. The next section covers the literature that pertains to audit market competition and audit 
quality as well as the hypotheses development. The third section reviews the sample selection and variables of interest. The fourth 




CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Several different areas of research relate to the relationship between competitive distances and audit quality. The background 
and hypotheses section is organized as follows. The first section covers a general overview of the audit market and its structure. The 
next section examines competition and the literature pertaining to competitive distances and the intersection of the small and large 
audit markets. Finally, the section concludes with development of the hypotheses.  
2.1 Audit Market 
 Audit market concentration and the concern over potential lack of competition has been an ongoing issue for the United 
States as well as other countries (Francis, Michas, and Seavey 2013a). In the U.S., the GAO has expressed concerns over audit market 
concentration and released reports in 2003 and 2008. In the 2008 report, the GAO addresses audit market concentration; however, they 
conclude that no immediate action is currently necessary (GAO 2008). Recently, studies have focused on how small audit firms 
compete and affect the large audit firms (Bills and Stephens 2016; Keune et al. 2016). The research question for this paper builds off 
the concept of competition at the intersection of small and large audit firms by using competitive distances to study the relationship 
between competition and audit quality.  
 Some researchers argue that the audit market can be divided into two separate markets, the “oligopolistic” large audit market 
(Big 4 firms: KPMG, Ernst and Young, Deloitte, PwC) and the “atomistic” small audit market (Non-Big 4 firms: Grant Thornton, 
Malone Bailey, BDO, etc.) (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006). In general, the large audit market is highly concentrated due to the limited 
number of potential suppliers. Also, the large audit market has access to more resources, which allows these firms to be dominant on a 
national and international scale. However, Simunic (2014) argues that the large audit market is closer to perfect competition than an 
oligopoly. In a perfectly competitive environment, all firms offer an identical product, and pricing is not controlled by the firms. On 
the other hand, the small audit market tends to be less concentrated, has access to fewer resources, and focuses more on a regional 
footprint. Despite these differences between the large and small audit markets, Hogan and Martin (2009) argue that small audit firms 
compete with large audit firms at the local level as evidenced by second-tiered auditors (non-Big 4 firms that are inspected annually 
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOB) that audit previous Big 4 clients. Overall, evidence suggests that an 
overlap between the large and small audit markets exists. 
2.2 Competition  
 Audit firms can compete on both price and quality; however, a tradeoff exists between audit effort and profit because 
unlimited audit hours are unreasonable and audit fees typically have an upper bound (Newton et al. 2013). Auditors may exert more 
audit effort to provide a higher quality audit, but they must either increase audit fees to compensate for their work or cut into the audit 
firm’s profits by charging less. In the audit literature, competition has been negatively associated with audit fees (Kallapur et al. 2010; 
Numan and Willekens 2012; Bills and Stephens 2016; Eshleman and Lawson 2017). Kallapur et al. (2010) use the Herfindahl index to 
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proxy competition, and it is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of all offices in a market. A larger Herfindahl index signals 
more concentration.  They find that lower concentration (higher competition) is associated with lower audit fees. Numan and 
Willekens (2012) find that higher competition, as proxied by competitive distance, decreases audit fees charged by Big 4 firms.    
Despite the consistent negative link between competition and audit fees, the relationship between competition and audit 
quality is unclear. First, in a highly competitive environment, competition may be negatively related to audit quality. Auditor 
switching is more likely; thus, auditors strive for client retention. One possible avenue for client retention is auditor leniency to 
maintain good client relations. Auditor leniency may include tolerating more earnings management, not correcting material 
misstatements, not issuing a material internal control weakness, or not issuing a going concern opinion. Additionally, when 
competition is high, auditors face greater audit fee pressure. To overcome these reduced fees, auditors may perform more efficient 
testing (but not necessarily effective), or auditors may reduce audit hours (audit effort) so that they can increase their profit. Caramanis 
and Lennox (2008) find evidence that reduced audit effort increases the likelihood of earnings management. The above descriptions 
would suggest lower audit quality in highly competitive environments.  On the other hand, in a highly competitive environment, 
another argument is that competition is positively connected to audit quality. To differentiate themselves from competition, auditors 
may seek more efficient and effective methods for audit testing or better technological advancements. These innovations (i.e. 
computerized work papers and data analytics tests) could improve audit quality (Polimeni, Burke, and Benyaminy 2010).  
The audit quality and competition debate can also go both directions when competition is low. When competition is low, the 
threat of auditor switching is less, and pressure to lower the audit fees is reduced. In this case, because auditors are less likely to be 
replaced, auditors may perform as a “watchdog” and be less tolerant of their client’s earnings management (Boone et al. 2012). Also, 
since auditors are not facing fee pressure, auditors can raise the audit price to compensate them for additional audit effort and perform 
a better quality audit. These scenarios suggest that less competition would lead to higher audit quality; however, less competition 
could also lead to lower audit quality. With fewer competitors, auditors may not be driven to improve and may become complacent in 
their work and have reduced skepticism toward their client’s financial statements (Boone et al. 2012). Lastly, market-based incentives 
such as litigation risk, reputation loss, and regulatory action from non-compliance may outweigh any competitive influence on audit 
quality. Thus, with all these potential outcomes, the relationship between audit quality and competition is an empirical question.  
Previous literature has studied the connection between competition and audit quality; however, the results are conflicting. 
Kallapur et al. (2010) and Newton et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between audit market concentration and audit quality. 
These studies provide evidence that as audit market concentration increases (less competition), companies have higher accrual quality 
(Kallapur et al. 2010) and are less likely to restate financial statements due to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
failure (Newton et al. 2013). Additionally, Eshleman and Lawson (2017) find that audit market concentration is positively associated 
with audit quality as proxied through absolute value of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals. Eshleman and Lawson (2017) 
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examine switching and non-switching audit clients, and they attribute their findings to non-switching clients and first-year 
engagements when the auditor does not lowball. This research study applies Eshleman’s and Lawson’s research design choices in the 
additional tests and sensitivity tests section.  On the other hand, Boone et al. (2012) demonstrate that an inverse relationship exists 
between audit market concentration and earnings quality. In their study, they show that in audit markets with higher concentration, 
companies are more likely to just beat analysts’ earnings forecast, suggesting concentration is associated with poorer audit quality. 
Lastly, Numan and Willekens (2014)  disentangle industry expertise and competition influences on audit quality. They demonstrate 
that in a single integrated audit market, increased competition decreases audit quality (lower likelihood of going concern issuances, 
more occurrence of restatements, and higher abnormal accruals). Numan and Willekens (2014) use competitive distance as their proxy 
for competition, which is derived from spatial economics.  
2.3 Competitive Distance 
More recent audit papers have utilized spatial economic theory when studying audit market competition. Previously, some 
audit papers proxied competition using a concentration measure known as the Herfindahl index (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; 
Bandyopadhyay and Kao 2004; Feldman 2006; Kallapur et al. 2010; Boone et al. 2012; Newton et al. 2013). An underlying 
assumption of the Herfindahl index is that all firms within an industry experience the same level of competition and compete on 
quantity and price in homogenous markets. Empirically, Numan and Willekens (2012) and Lennox and Liu (2012) argue that this 
assumption does not hold in audit markets because firms face differing amounts of competition. Consider a scenario with a large, well-
known firm and a small, unknown firm. A larger, well-established firm’s strategy may relate to maintaining their client base; whereas, 
a small, young firm must strive to overcome entry barriers and gain market share. The larger, older firm may have less competition 
compared to the smaller, younger firm. The Herfindahl index does not necessarily distinguish between these two firms. Instead of 
using the Herfindahl index, some papers use competitive distance.  
  Competitive distance is a measure of competition that considers a firm’s location in the market relative to another firm. 
Specifically, competitive distance is defined as the smallest absolute market share difference between company i and its closest 
competitor. In general, spatial economics proposes that as the distance in market location between two firms decreases, competition 
increases, and equilibrium prices become closer to marginal costs (Hotelling 1929). These competitive distances can be measured 
between different competitors and at different levels. 
Competitive distance has been applied in the context of audit fees as well as audit quality (Numan and Willekens 2012, 2014; 
Newton et al. 2015; Bills and Stephens 2016). Numan and Willekens (2012) show that a decrease in competitive distance (increased 
competition) is associated with a decrease in audit fees. In other words, as the difference between Big 4 market share decreases (as Big 
4 firms are closer in market share), audit fees decrease. This finding is also supported by Bills and Stephens (2016). For audit quality, 
Numan and Willekens (2014) demonstrate that as competitive distance decreases between audit firms in a single integrated market, 
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audit quality decreases. Also, industry expertise becomes insignificant in their models when competitive distance is added. Unlike 
Numan and Willekens (2014) who examine the audit market and competition without differentiating between large and small audit 
firms, this study examines if competitive distance has a different influence in the large audit market versus the small audit market and 
between these two markets. 
2.4 Competitive Distance Between the Large and Small Audit Markets 
 In the audit literature, a shift from a national level to the local office level has occurred. The local office level is important for 
several reasons. First, audit firms strive to have uniform quality across all offices through firm-wide best practices; however, the 
decentralized nature of firms and the difficulties of nation-wide knowledge sharing may cause audit quality to differ from office to 
office (Krishnan 2005). Second, client engagement, audit fee pricing, and audit opinion decisions are made at the office level (Francis, 
Stokes, and Anderson 1999;  Reynolds and Francis 2000). Lastly, research has provided evidence that factors such as office size, 
office location, and office environment affect audit quality (Krishnan 2005; Francis, Michas, and Yu 2013b). Therefore, it is important 
to study competition at a local-industry level instead of at a national level. 
At a local-industry level, more consideration is placed on small audit firms. Research on small audit firms has shown that, 
like Big 4 firms, small audit firms differentiate themselves through quality and pricing (Bills, Cunningham, and Myers 2016; Bills and 
Stephens 2016; Keune et al. 2016). For example, Bills et al. (2016) show that small audit firms that are part of accounting associations 
provide higher audit quality (fewer PCAOB inspection deficiencies, fewer misstatements, and less extreme abnormal accruals) and 
charge a premium compared to non-associated small audit firms. An accounting association offers member firms expertise from other 
independent member firms, joint conferences and training, personnel for geographic limitations, and the use of the association’s logo. 
Additionally, Bills and Stephens (2016) and Keune et al. (2016) find that small audit firms compete with large audit firms. 
 Keune et al. (2016) examine small audit firm competition and audit fees in the top 50 largest MSAs. They measure 
competition as the presence of a non-Big 4 local market leader. This unique measure is based off rankings that consider overall 
services provided by audit firms such as public and private engagements, tax services, and consulting services. The authors find that 
the presence of a non-Big 4 leader decreases audit fees; however, a non-Big 4 is not a perfect substitute due to differing premiums 
between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms. Overall, their paper demonstrates that an overlap of knowledge between private and public 
engagements exists and that a non-Big 4 audit firm with a strong local reputation is a competitor to a Big 4 firm. 
Another paper that researches small audit market competition and audit fees is Bills and Stephens (2016). This paper 
accounts for the two-tiered nature of the audit market: large audit firms (Big 4) and small audit firms (non-Big 4) by applying 
competitive distances similar to Numan and Willekens (2012). Bills and Stephens (2016) measure competitive distance within and 
between the large and small audit markets. Their findings suggest that the local-industry market share distance between large and 
small audit firms has an influence on Big 4 audit fees. Specifically, as a small audit firm decreases the local-industry market share 
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distance between itself and a large audit firm, the large audit firm deceases its audit fees. Furthermore, Bills and Stephens (2016) show 
that as the small audit firm increases the competitive distance between themselves and other small audit firms, their audit fee 
increases. Lastly, as a small audit firm decreases the local-industry market share distance between itself and a large audit firm, the 
small audit firm increases audit fees. The authors explain that this result stems from the lookalike theory. The lookalike theory states 
that lookalike products “mimic” national brands and advance their competitive position simply because customers perceive them to be 
similar since they are in the same product category (Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002; Richards, Hamilton, and Patterson 2010; Johnson, 
Gibson, and Freeman 2013). 
In summary, the relationship between competition and audit fees is consistent; however, audit fees only represent one aspect 
of audit quality. The link between audit fees and audit quality remains blurred in the current accounting literature. In his review of 
audit literature, Francis (2011) suggests that it is unclear whether abnormal audit fees capture auditor independence issues (economic 
rents) or abnormally high audit effort (better audit quality) that is unobservable to academic researchers. Exactly what factors 
comprise audit fees is unknown; however, Hay, Knechel, and Wong (2006) break the audit fee model used by researchers down into 
client attributes, engagement attributes, and auditor attributes. Under economic rent theory, excessive fees represent a conflict of 
interest and impair auditor independence (Zeff 2003; Church, Jenkins, McCracken, Roush, and Stanley 2014). On the other hand, 
under the audit effort story, more effort suggests better audit quality assurance. If a client has poorer reporting quality, then the auditor 
must exert more effort to provide a quality audit, and the auditors charge higher fees in order to be compensated (Hribar, Kravet, and 
Wilson 2014). Consequently, it is important to use other output measures of audit quality, and it is not desirable to rely solely on audit 
fees as representing higher or lower audit quality.  
2.5 Hypotheses 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between audit quality and competitive distances within and between 
the large and small audit markets at a local-industry level. The large audit market is defined as all Big 4 accounting firms, and the 
small audit market is defined as all non-Big 4 accounting firms. As detailed above, the relationship between competition and audit 
quality is unclear. Auditors must balance audit effort exerted and audit fees. In competitive environments, auditors face fee pressure 
and a higher risk of auditor turnover. Auditors compete to retain clients by lowering audit fees. A decrease in audit fees may imply a 
decrease in audit effort, which in turn, suggests lower audit quality (Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon 2015). Additionally, the audit 
firms may be entrenched in their clients and lack independence. If an audit firm loses a client, it would result in lower audit fees and a 
possible loss of their market position. Thus, an audit firm may be more tolerant of earnings management to keep the client.  In 
contrast, more competition may encourage more innovation among auditors as auditors attempt to distinguish themselves from others. 
Innovation may lead to more efficient and effective audit techniques, which improves audit quality. Another viewpoint is that low 
competition stimulates complacency in auditors. As an audit firm pulls further away from their competition, the audit firm may not be 
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motivated to continue to provide higher audit quality. The audit firm may become lax or less skeptical in their testing, leading to a 
higher likelihood of not discovering and/or correcting a material misstatement. Conversely, in low competitive environments, auditors 
are less likely to succumb to audit fee pressures because auditor turnover is lower. If a client’s financial statements need extensive 
audit testing, the audit firm can adjust the contract accordingly without fear of losing the client. Also, an auditor may be less tolerant 
of earnings management and push back on the client’s judgments when necessary.  Finally, reputation loss, litigation risk, and 
regulatory action for non-compliance may be sufficient market-based institutional incentives to encourage auditors to perform their 
jobs in an independent and professional manner. As such, competition (high or low) would not have an influence on audit quality. 
Because of these opposing scenarios, this paper does not make directional hypotheses about the relationship between competition and 
audit quality.  
For the research question, competition is proxied by competitive distance. Competitive distance is measured between two 
large audit firms, between two small audit firms, and between large and small audit firms. Each measure of competitive distance and 
its relationship with audit quality is addressed as its own hypothesis. The hypotheses are listed below in the null form: 
Hypothesis 1: In the large audit market, competitive distance between two large audit firms is not associated with audit 
                                     quality.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In the large audit market, competitive distance between a large audit firm and its nearest small audit firm 
                       competitor is not associated with audit quality. 
 
Hypothesis 3: In the small audit market, competitive distance between two small audit firms is not associated with audit 
                                     quality. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In the small audit market, competitive distance between a small audit firm and its nearest large firm  
                       competitor is not associated with audit quality. 
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CHAPTER 3.  SAMPLE AND COMPETITIVE DISTANCE DEFINITIONS 
 
 This next section covers the sample and competitive distance definitions. The first part of the section describes the samples 
and sample attrition. The second part of the section provides details on the calculation of competitive distance as the proxy for 
competition and the reasoning behind this measure. 
3.1 Sample 
  
For the sample construction, Audit Analytics is used to retrieve audit fees, auditor location information, and data related to 
restatements, audit opinions, and internal control weaknesses. Compustat data is used to 
gather a company’s financial information needed to construct variables such as firm size, health, growth, leverage, etc. Lastly, CRSP 
is used for stock return information. Each sample covers the years 2004-2015, except for the restatement samples. Restatement 
samples cover the years 2004-2013 because previous research provides evidence that on average, two years pass between the 
misstatement period and the discovery of the restatement (Cheffers, Whalen, and Usvyatsky 2010). The market share data related to 
audit fees is constructed using the full Audit Analytics database before any observations are removed. Additionally, the calculation for 
abnormal accruals uses the full sample of Compustat with the necessary variables available before eliminating any firm-year 
observations.  
For the main tests discussed in Section 4, a total of six different samples are used to test the various hypotheses. First, the 
sample is divided into two groups: large audit firms (only Big 4) and small audit firms (only non-Big 4). This methodology of Big 4 
versus non-Big 4 is consistent with the sample construction from Bills and Stephens (2016). From these two groups, the final samples 
are created for the three audit quality measures: absolute value of abnormal accruals, restatements, and going concern opinions. The 
large audit market samples test the first two hypotheses related to audit quality and competitive distance between large audit firms and 
competitive distance between large and small audit firms. The small audit market samples explore Hypotheses 3 and 4. These 
hypotheses test if a relationship exists between audit quality and the competitive distance between small audit firms and competitive 
distance between the small and large audit firms. In Section 5, the same sample methodology is used to test audit quality and local 
competitive distances.    
Table 1 displays the sample attrition for the local-industry samples. For both the large and small audit firm samples, markets 
are defined as SIC, MSA for each year represented in the samples.  First, the samples begin with all non-utility (SIC 40-49) and non-
financial (SIC 60-69) firm observations in Audit Analytics that also have the corresponding Compustat and CRSP data for their 
respective measures of audit quality.2 Next, the samples are partitioned into large audit firms (Big 4) and small audit firms (non-Big 
4). From here, any large (small) audit market with only one large (small) audit firm present is removed. In other words, each large 
(small) audit market has a minimum of two large (small) audit firms. Finally, one of the variables of interest measures the difference 
                                                          
2 Utilities and financial institutions are excluded due to their different operating features and regulatory requirements (Fields, Fraser, 
and Wilkins 2004; Boone et al. 2012).  
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in market shares between a large audit firm and its closest small audit firm competitor and vice-versa. This measure requires each 
large (small) audit market to have at least one small (large) audit firm present. Any observations are deleted that do not meet these 
market requirements.  By default, each audit market has at least three audit firms present (some combination of large and small audit 
firms) and at least three clients. Table 1 displays the sample attrition3.  
  
                                                          
3 This sample follows the same guidelines for sample attrition from Bills and Stephens (2016). Additionally, this sample is used to 











Going Concern Opinion 





 Large Firms Small Firms 
     
Data from 2004-2015 with sufficient information for control variables 
(excludes financial and utility industries)* 
 28,150 28,150  26,296 26,296  23,734 23,734 
   
 















































           
*Note: Restatement sample covers the years 2004-2013 to allow for 
 sufficient discovery time for the restatements to be reported.      
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3.2 Competitive Distance   
 
 Throughout the competition literature, competition has been defined in different ways. Some of the proxies for competition 
include the Herfindahl index, competitive distance, market leadership, and intersection of small and large audit markets. Competitive 
distance in this paper is used to proxy for competition for several reasons. First, this research paper is interested in studying the impact 
of both small and large audit firm competition within the markets as well as between the markets. The Herfindahl index does not allow 
measurement between markets; however, competitive distance does capture competition within a market and between markets.  
Second, studies that use concentration measures find mixed results on the relationship between audit market concentration 
and audit quality (Kallapur et al. 2010; Boone et al. 2012; Francis et al. 2013a; Newton et al. 2013). Numan and Willekens (2014) 
argue that a lack of theory connecting market concentration and product quality exists. They also suggest that other competition 
measures besides concentration affect audit quality such as industry specialization, which is typically based on market share. 
Additionally, several academic studies have debated that high industry concentration does not automatically imply low competition 
within a market (Dedman and Lennox 2009; Lennox and Liu 2012; Numan and Willekens 2012).   
Lastly, competitive distance as a proxy for competition has been used in previous studies (Numan and Willekens 2012, 2014; 
Newton et al. 2015; Bills and Stephens 2016). Numan and Willekens (2012) and Bills and Stephens (2016) study competitive distance 
and audit fees. Newton et al. (2015) examine competitive distance and internal control opinion shopping, while Numan and Willekens 
(2014) observe competitive distance and audit quality. Finally, Bills and Stephens (2016) also study competitive distance within and 
between the large and small audit markets, so this study expands upon their findings on audit fees and examines the relationship 
between audit quality and competitive distance within and between the large and small audit markets.  
Competitive distance is derived from spatial economics and is computed using a firm’s market share location relative to their 
closest competitor’s market share. The smallest absolute difference in market share between two firms is used because firms compete 
to gain power within a market. A firm’s biggest threat to losing their relative market position is going to be those firms that are located 
closest to it in market share. To construct the competitive distance variable, the methodology of Bills and Stephens (2016) is followed, 
and it uses local-industry market share. Also, competitive distance is measured at the local market share level, without taking into 
consideration the industry market share, following Numan and Willekens (2012) and Newton et al. (2015). The results of the local 
competitive distance are discussed in Section 5. 
B4_TO_B4 (NB4_TO_NB4) is the smallest absolute industry market share difference between company i’s Big 4 (non-Big 
4) auditor and its closest Big 4 (non-Big 4) audit firm competitor in a two-digit SIC industry within an MSA in a year. These two 
variables capture competition within a market. 
  B4_TO_NB4 and NB4_TO_B4 are used to proxy for competition between a large audit firm and a small audit firm and vice 
versa. B4_TO_NB4 (NB4_TO_B4) is defined as the smallest industry market share difference between company i's Big 4 (non-Big 4) 
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auditor and its closest non-Big 4 (Big 4) audit firm competitor in a two-digit SIC industry within an MSA in a year. These two 




CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 
 DeAngelo (1981) states that audit quality is “the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both detect a 
breach in the client’s accounting system, and report the breach.” Audit research relies on many different proxies to capture audit 
quality.  Some of these measures are outputs of the audit process (e.g. going concern opinions, financial reporting quality measures) 
and some of these measures of audit quality are audit input oriented (e.g. auditor size, audit fees) (DeFond and Zhang 2014). The 
problem with audit quality is that audit quality is not the only factor that influences financial reporting quality; rather, financial 
reporting quality is a function of the innate characteristics of the firm, the financial reporting system, and the audit quality. Three 
measures of audit quality are tested in this paper to provide in-depth detail about the relationship between audit quality and the 
competitive distances within and between the small and large audit markets. 
4.1 Abnormal Accruals 
The first proxy for audit quality is based on abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE). This proxy is defined as the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals as measured using the performance-adjusted abnormal accruals model based on the cross-sectional 
modified Jones equation (Jones 1991; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005). Previous audit literature has associated lower abnormal 
accruals with higher audit quality. For example, industry experts, larger offices, and Big N auditors have all been linked with lower 
abnormal accruals, and accordingly, higher audit quality (Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; 
Francis and Yu 2009; Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang 2010; Reichelt and Wang 2010). The reasoning behind this measure is that higher 
quality auditors should not tolerate higher abnormal accruals, and higher quality auditors should be able to detect and restrain any 
opportunistic reporting actions by management.   
Abnormal accruals are a measure of financial reporting quality that proxy for managers’ opportunistic reporting calculated as 
the residual from Equation (1).  Equation (1) regresses total accruals on the reciprocal of lagged total assets, change in sales less 
change in receivables, property, plant, and equipment, and return on assets. The equation is estimated by size-year deciles, following 
the methodology of Ecker, Francis, Olsson, and Schipper (2013). Size is defined as lagged total assets. Following Ecker et al. (2013), 
11 observations per size-year estimate are required, which reduces the sample attrition associated with estimating accruals by two-
digit SIC year.4 
The equation below estimates abnormal accruals as follows:  
               TAi,t=β0+β1(1/Ai,t-1)+β2(ΔSalesi,t - ΔReci,t)+β3PPEi,t+ β4ROAi,t+ εi,t                               (1) 
where: 
                                                          
4 Ecker et al. (2013) suggest estimating accrual regressions based on size to reduce sample attrition. They find that estimation samples 
grouped on similarity in lagged assets detect abnormal accruals at least as well as estimation samples grouped by industry peers. 
Additionally, research has shown that companies of comparable size are also similar in growth, complexity, and monitoring, which are 
characteristics that have been linked to accruals. Equation (1) is estimated based on lagged total assets grouped in deciles by year.  
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TAi,t = total accruals for company i in year t, calculated as income before extraordinary items less net cash flow from 
operating activities, scaled by company i’s total assets in year t-1, 
 Ai, t-1 = lagged total assets for company i in year t-1,  
ΔSalesi,t = change in sales for company i between year t-1 and year t, scaled by total assets for company i in year t-1, 
ΔReci,t = change in receivables for company i between year t-1 and year t, scaled by total assets for company i in year t-1, 
PPEi,t = net property, plant, and equipment for company i in year t, scaled by total assets for company i in year t-1, 
ROAi,t = return on assets for company i in year t (net income in year t divided by assets in year t) 
The absolute value of the residual in Equation (1) represents abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE).  Lower abnormal 
accruals suggest less earnings management and less financial misreporting, which in turn, implies higher audit quality. Advantages of 
the absolute value of abnormal accruals are that it is linked to the continuous nature of audit quality and may signal more egregious, 
undetected misstatements. Also, abnormal accruals depict quality variation for many firms (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Limitations of 
abnormal accruals are that it is subject to measurement error and sensitivity as well as potential bias. Additionally, several different 
ways exist to measure abnormal accruals (Kothari et al. 2005). To overcome these limitations of abnormal accruals, other measures of 
audit quality are used to test the hypotheses. 
To test if audit quality and competitive distance are related, the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE) is 
regressed on the aforementioned proxies of competitive distance and a set of control variables from prior studies (Reichelt and Wang 
2010; Numan and Willekens 2014; and Bills and Stephens 2016). Industry and year fixed effects are also included in the model, and 
heteroskedasticity is controlled for by using robust standard errors that are clustered by company. Some companies are too large for 
small audit firms to audit since small audit firms may lack the necessary resources to provide a quality audit. Additionally, some 
companies are too small and cannot afford a large audit firm.  Therefore, Equations (2a) and (2b) are estimated using the full sample, 
and then, the equations are run separately based on a company’s filing status (large accelerated, accelerated, and non-accelerated). 
Separating the regressions by filing status allows similar observations to be grouped together and allows the coefficients on the 
variables of interest to differ depending on the filing status of the companies.  
ABS_DACC_SIZEi,t =β1B4_TO_B4i,t +β2B4_TO_NB4i,t +β3JOINT_SPECi,t +β4HERFi,t +β5SIZEi,t +β6 LEVi,t +β7CFOi,t 
                                   +β8 STD_CFOi,t +β9MBi,t +β10LOSSi,t +β11ABS_LTAi,t +β12Z_SCOREi,t +β13LITi,t +β14TENUREi,t 
                                   +β15AB_FEEi,t +β16 MAT_WEAKi,,t+Industry and Year fixed effectsi,t +ɛi,t                                               (2a)  
 
ABS_DACC_SIZEi,t =β1NB4_TO_NB4i,t + β2NB4_TO_B4i,t + β3SPECi,t +β4HERFi,t +β5SIZEi,t +β6LEVi,t +β7CFOi,t  
                                                  +β8 STD_CFOi,t +β9MBi,t +β10LOSSi,t +β11ABS_LTAi,t +β12Z_SCOREi,t +β13LITi,t +β14TENUREi,t 
                                                  +β15AB_FEEi,t +β16 MAT_WEAKi,,t +β17TIER_2 i,t +Industry and Year fixed effectsi,t+ɛi,t                         (2b) 
 
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. Note, when the equation is run to test the association between audit quality and 
local competitive distance (ignoring industry), B4_TO_B4 is replaced with B4_TO_B4_MSA and B4_TO_NB4 is replaced by 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA for the large audit firm sample in Equation (2a). For the small audit firm sample at the local level, NB4_TO_B4 is 
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replaced by NB4_TO_B4_MSA and NB4_TO_NB4 is replaced by NB4_TO_NB4_MSA in Equation (2b). Also, HERF is replaced by 
HERF_MSA for Equations (2a) and (2b).  See Section 5.  
 The variables of interest in Equation (2a) are B4_TO_B4 (H1) and B4_TO_NB4 (H2). If the coefficient on B4_TO_B4 is 
negative, it suggests that as competitive distance decreases between large audit firms (proxying an increase in competition), then 
abnormal accruals are higher, signaling poorer audit quality. This result follows the view that competition influences auditors to be 
more lenient with their clients to retain them, and competition impairs auditor quality. If the coefficient on B4_TO_B4 is positive, it 
signals that as competitive distances between large audit firms decrease, abnormal accruals also decrease, supporting the concept that 
competition is positively related to audit quality. The same outcomes hold true for the coefficient on B4_TO_NB4, except that it is 
testing Hypothesis 2, which tests the relationship between audit quality and competitive distance of a large audit firm and its nearest 
small audit firm competitor. 
Equation (2b) applies to Hypotheses 3 and 4, and the variables of interest are NB4_TO_NB4 (H3) and NB4_TO_B4 (H4). 
Hypothesis 3 pertains to the small audit firm samples and the relationship between audit quality and the competitive distance between 
small audit firms. Similar to above, a negative coefficient on NB4_TO_NB4 demonstrates that decreasing competitive distance 
between small audit firms leads to higher abnormal accruals (lower audit quality).  In contrast, if NB4_TO_NB4 is positive, it signals 
that decreasing competitive distance between small audit firms is associated with lower abnormal accruals (higher audit quality).  
Lastly, Hypothesis 4 examines if small audit firm quality is associated with competitive distance between the small and large audit 
firms. The coefficient’s relationships remain the same as those discussed previously; however, competitive distance is capturing the 
competition between a small audit firm and its nearest large audit firm competitor.  
 Within Equations (2a) and (2b), other competition measures such as concentration within the audit market (HERF) and 
competition based on industry specialization (JOINT_SPEC, SPEC, TIER_2) are control variables. Previous studies have found 
associations between competition, specialization, and abnormal accruals (Kallapur et al. 2010; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Boone et al. 
2012; Numan and Willekens 2014). JOINT_SPEC, SPEC, and TIER_2 are predicted to have negative coefficients since previous 
literature has shown that these types of auditors are associated with lower abnormal accruals and higher audit quality (Reichelt and 
Wang 2010). Consistent with prior studies, negative coefficients are expected for SIZE, LEV, and CFO. Larger firms (SIZE) are 
associated with more steady accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002). More highly leveraged firms have been linked to lower abnormal 
accruals (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998), and firms with higher operating cash 
flows perform better and have lower accruals (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002). Firms that have higher bankruptcy risk 
(Z_SCORE, LOSS) as well as firms in high litigation industries (LIT) are projected to have higher abnormal accruals since these are 
riskier firms, and these firms face financial pressure to manipulate earnings. Additionally, firms with more growth (MB), higher prior 
year accruals (ABS_LTA), and higher volatility of cash flow from operations (STD_CFO) are expected to have higher abnormal 
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accruals as these characteristics are associated with unstable and volatile financial environments. Audit tenure (TENURE) is a control 
variable because regulators debate if longer tenure impairs auditor independence and audit quality. Material weakness (MAT_WEAK) 
is a control variable since material weaknesses have been linked to higher abnormal accruals (Doyle, Ge, and McVay 2007b). 
AB_FEE is included to control for additional audit effort (Newton et al. 2013).  In conclusion, industry and year fixed effects are 
included to control for time and industry effects on the absolute value of abnormal accruals.  
 Table 2: Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for Equations (2a) and (2b) for the large and small audit firm samples 
associated with the local-industry competitive distance measure. To reduce the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. These abnormal accrual samples have a total of 11,302 observations and 4,758 observations 
for the large audit firm sample and the small audit firm sample, respectively. The mean for B4_TO_B4 is 0.223, and B4_TO_NB4 has 
a mean of 0.322. These means are similar to Bills and Stephens (2016) that report means of 0.227 and 0.321 for B4_TO_B4 and 
B4_TO_NB4, respectively. In the small audit firm sample, NB4_TO_NB4 has a mean of 0.050, and NB4_TO_B4 has a mean of 
0.187. Bills and Stephens (2016) report means of 0.031 for NB4_TO_NB4 and 0.162 for NB4_TO_B4. ABS_DACC_SIZE has a 
mean of 0.063 for the large audit firm sample and a mean of 0.088 for the small audit firm sample. The large audit firm sample mean 
for ABS_DACC_SIZE is lower than other studies (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Numan and Willekens 2014); however, this sample is 
limited to only companies audited by Big 4 firms. Big 4 firms have been associated with lower abnormal accruals (Francis et al. 
1999a). The following control variables are comparable in means to prior literature for the large audit firm sample: HERF, SIZE, 
LEV, MB, LOSS, ABS_LTA, LIT, and JOINT_SPEC (Reichelt and Wang 2010, Numan and Willekens 2014, and Bills and Stephens 
2016).  The means for STD_CFO and TENURE are slightly lower than previous studies; while the means for CFO and Z_SCORE are 
higher. These differences may be due to sample restriction (Big 4 only) as well as differences in time periods. For the small audit firm 
sample, LEV, MB, and SPEC are similar to the means stated in Bills and Stephens (2016) and Bills et al. (2016), two prior studies 
with small audit firm samples covering similar time periods. The remaining control variables vary somewhat from other studies. This 






Panel A: Local-Industry Abnormal Accruals Samples 
  
Large Audit Firm Sample (N=11,302) Small Audit Firm Sample (N=4,758) 
  
 Variable Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile   Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
ABS_DACC_SIZE 0.063 0.065 0.019 0.042 0.084   0.088 0.089 0.026 0.060 0.118 
B4_TO_B4 0.223 0.223 0.053 0.133 0.343   - - - - - 
B4_TO_NB4 0.322 0.231 0.134 0.271 0.486   - - - - - 
NB4_TO_NB4 - - - - -   0.050 0.088 0.002 0.012 0.052 
NB4_TO_B4 - - - - -   0.187 0.242 0.031 0.084 0.224 
JOINT_SPEC 0.167 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000   - - - - - 
SPEC - - - - -   0.056 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HERF 0.409 0.149 0.288 0.378 0.491   0.423 0.173 0.286 0.383 0.519 
SIZE 6.950 1.811 5.686 6.860 8.118   4.161 1.756 2.934 4.147 5.397 
LEV 0.162 0.194 0.000 0.100 0.260   0.119 0.204 0.000 0.013 0.161 
CFO 0.071 0.171 0.032 0.096 0.156   0.013 0.225 -0.053 0.049 0.130 
STD_CFO 0.074 0.103 0.022 0.042 0.081   0.144 0.268 0.037 0.072 0.136 
MB 3.310 4.747 1.415 2.360 3.979   2.636 5.401 0.870 1.638 3.233 
LOSS 0.333 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000   0.505 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ABS_LTA 0.103 0.116 0.035 0.070 0.126   0.173 0.301 0.042 0.091 0.177 
Z_SCORE 1.868 2.584 1.026 2.063 3.170   1.028 5.038 -0.222 1.786 3.382 
LIT 0.354 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000   0.338 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TENURE 1.618 0.613 1.099 1.609 2.079   1.174 0.715 0.693 1.386 1.792 
AB_FEE 0.182 0.504 -0.144 0.187 0.513   -0.154 0.555 -0.488 -0.123 0.213 
MAT_WEAK 0.101 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.191 0.393 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TIER_2 - - - - -   0.315 0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LARGE_ACC_FILER 0.563 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000   0.102 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACC_FILER 0.337 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000   0.316 0.465 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NON_ACC_FILER 0.100 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.583 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
            
(Table 2: cont’d.) 
 
 




Panel B:  Local-Industry Restatement Samples 
  Large Audit Firm Sample (N=9,813)   Small Audit Firm Sample (N=5,572) 
Variable  Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile   Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
RESTATE 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIG_R 0.057 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.061 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LITTLE_R 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.028 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 
B4_TO_B4 0.223 0.225 0.052 0.132 0.340  - - - - - 
B4_TO_NB4 0.318 0.234 0.126 0.266 0.480  - - - - - 
NB4_TO_NB4 - - - - -  0.039 0.086 0.001 0.007 0.034 
NB4_TO_B4 - - - - - 
 
0.191 0.246 0.030 0.087 0.229 
JOINT_SPEC 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000  - - - - - 
SPEC - - - - -  0.041 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HERF 0.409 0.150 0.287 0.378 0.493 
 
0.425 0.179 0.280 0.383 0.528 
SIZE 6.724 1.851 5.475 6.644 7.908 
 
3.639 1.930 2.426 3.705 5.012 
LEV 0.156 0.200 0.000 0.081 0.252 
 
0.188 0.549 0.000 0.002 0.147 
LOSS 0.359 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
0.630 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MB 3.123 4.499 1.387 2.297 3.862 
 
1.617 16.853 0.406 1.401 3.395 
ROA -0.054 0.277 -0.065 0.035 0.081 
 
-2.160 8.895 -0.661 -0.087 0.043 
LOG_SEG 0.830 0.301 0.693 0.693 1.099 
 
0.691 0.302 0.693 0.693 0.693 
FOREIGN 0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
0.223 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MERGER 0.449 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
0.188 0.391 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ARINV 0.203 0.151 0.083 0.177 0.293 
 
0.242 0.221 0.049 0.187 0.388 
FIN 0.154 0.244 0.008 0.038 0.198 
 
0.445 1.140 0.001 0.044 0.397 
EPR -0.006 0.242 -0.023 0.048 0.093 
 
-0.245 0.806 -0.218 -0.043 0.058 
FREEC -0.014 0.233 -0.047 0.043 0.104 
 
-0.869 3.247 -0.455 -0.069 0.048 
MAT_WEAK 0.109 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRM_SIZE 3.606 1.038 2.996 3.738 4.143 
 
1.244 1.002 0.000 1.099 2.079 
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.061 0.115 0.009 0.022 0.056 
 
0.468 0.384 0.115 0.323 1.000 
            
(Table 2: cont’d.) 
 
















































Variable  Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile   Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
GC 0.032 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.274 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TENURE 1.535 0.581 1.099 1.609 1.946  1.075 0.695 0.693 1.099 1.609 
AB_FEE 0.184 0.520 -0.150 0.184 0.526  -0.074 0.680 -0.475 -0.073 0.316 
LRESTATE 0.118 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.086 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TIER_2 - - - - - 
 
0.260 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LARGE_ACC_FILER 0.526 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
0.077 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACC_FILER 0.343 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NON_ACC_FILER 0.131 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.666 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel C: Local-Industry Going Concern Opinion Samples 
  Large Audit Firm Sample (N=3,432)   Small Audit Firm Sample (N=1,780) 
Variable  Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile   Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
GC 0.059 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.113 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.000 
B4_TO_B4 0.225 0.226 0.052 0.133 0.359   - - - - - 
B4_TO_NB4 0.308 0.238 0.110 0.254 0.477   - - - - - 
NB4_TO_NB4 - - - - -   0.044 0.078 0.002 0.011 0.044 
NB4_TO_B4 - - - - -   0.158 0.221 0.024 0.071 0.157 
JOINT_SPEC 0.134 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000   - - - - - 
SPEC - - - - -   0.048 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HERF 0.408 0.148 0.292 0.375 0.488   0.412 0.169 0.272 0.373 0.512 
SIZE 5.841 1.545 4.844 5.752 6.820   4.088 1.480 3.000 4.061 5.141 
MB 3.270 7.462 1.068 1.996 4.083   2.898 6.308 0.825 1.600 3.565 
DEBT 0.501 0.334 0.248 0.446 0.663   0.471 0.344 0.231 0.401 0.618 
LOSS_GC 0.738 0.440 0.000 1.000 1.000   0.794 0.404 1.000 1.000 1.000 
            






Variable Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile   Mean Std Dev First Quartile Median Third Quartile 
L_LOSS_GC 0.640 0.480 0.000 1.000 1.000   0.683 0.465 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STD_SALE 0.121 0.119 0.041 0.086 0.161   0.151 0.153 0.047 0.103 0.202 
Z_SCORE -0.352 4.181 -1.458 0.566 1.716   -0.824 5.752 -2.013 0.605 2.064 
CASH 0.406 0.288 0.150 0.362 0.646   0.313 0.282 0.085 0.222 0.470 
MAT_WEAK 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.179 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOG_SEG 0.739 0.255 0.693 0.693 0.693   0.723 0.264 0.693 0.693 0.693 
LOG_GEO 0.979 0.692 0.693 1.099 1.609   0.833 0.675 0.000 0.693 1.386 
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.045 0.093 0.007 0.016 0.039   0.389 0.363 0.088 0.225 0.666 
L_GC 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.076 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000 
REPORT_LAG 54.216 19.219 39.000 54.000 67.000   69.763 20.461 56.000 71.000 85.000 
L_RETURN 0.023 0.828 -0.418 -0.123 0.232   -0.018 0.842 -0.484 -0.188 0.169 
STD_RET 0.165 0.084 0.109 0.147 0.197   0.185 0.104 0.116 0.162 0.220 
TENURE 1.619 0.601 1.386 1.609 2.079   1.164 0.721 0.693 1.386 1.792 
AB_FEE 0.211 0.514 -0.107 0.209 0.546   -0.103 0.552 -0.451 -0.078 0.269 
TIER_2 - - - - -   0.311 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LARGE_ACC_FILER 0.325 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000   0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACC_FILER 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000   0.355 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NON_ACC_FILER 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.563 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Pearson (Spearman) correlations among the variables for the abnormal accruals samples are shown below (above) the 
diagonal in the correlation table, Table 3: Panels A and B. Note, a high correlation of 0.67 (Pearson) and 0.57 (Spearman) exists 
between B4_TO_NB4 and B4_TO_B4, thus multicollinearity is a possible concern in the large audit firm sample. In the estimation of 
the models in Table 4, all variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the control variables are less than 10. VIFs of less than 10 do not 
indicate a concern for possible multicollinearity, when interpreting results (Kennedy 2008). In the large audit firm correlation table, a 
negative, significant correlation exists between abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE) and both variables of interest (B4_TO_B4 and 
B4_TO_NB4). This correlation suggests that as competitive distances decrease, abnormal accruals increase. For the small audit firm 
correlation table, ABS_DACC_SIZE is negatively and significantly correlated with NB4_TO_NB4 and positively (but not 
significantly) correlated with NB4_TO_B4.  
 The results of estimating Equations (2a) and (2b) are shown in Table 4. Panel A shows the regression results using all 
observations for both the large audit firm and small audit firm samples. In Panel A of Table 4, the first three columns display the 
coefficients, p-values, and significance levels for the large audit firm sample, which addresses the first two hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between audit quality (proxied by abnormal accruals) and competitive distances in the large audit firm market. The 
majority of the control variables are either significantly associated with abnormal accruals in the directions suggested from prior 
literature or are in the predicted direction but insignificant. The coefficients on B4_TO_B4 and B4_TO_NB4 are negative; however, 
neither coefficient loads significantly.  These insignificant coefficients suggest that the competitive distances in the large audit market 
do not affect audit quality as proxied by abnormal accruals.   
 The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns in Panel A of Table 4 represent the coefficients, p-values, and significance levels for 
Equation (2b), using the small audit firm sample. This panel tests if an association exists between audit quality (proxied by abnormal 
accruals) and competitive distances in the small audit market. Similar to the large audit firm results, the majority of the control 
variables are in their predicted directions as suggested by prior literature. Hypothesis 3 specifically focuses on audit quality and the 
competitive distance between two small audit firms (NB4_TO_NB4).  NB4_TO_NB4 is negative and significant at p < 0.05. This 
relationship suggests that as the competitive distance decreases between two small audit firms, abnormal accruals increase. In other 
words, more competition leads to poorer audit quality in terms of abnormal accruals. The coefficient on NB4_TO_B4 is not 
significant, signifying that competitive distance between a small audit firm and its nearest large audit firm competitor does not affect 
audit quality, as measured by abnormal accruals.  
 Next, in Table 4: Panel B, Equations (2a) and (2b) are estimated for each filing type: large accelerated filers 
(LARGE_ACC_FILER), accelerated filers (ACC_FILER), and non-accelerated filers (NON_ACC_FILER) for both the large audit 
firm and small audit firm samples. For the large audit firm sample, the coefficients for B4_TO_B4 and B4_TO_NB4 are not 
significant. This evidence suggests that regardless of a client’s filing type, competitive distance is not associated with abnormal 
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accruals in the large audit firm market. On the other hand, in the small audit firm sample, variations exist among the filing types. 
Evidence (p < 0.01) suggests that the competitive distance between small audit firms (NB4_TO_NB4) is negatively associated with 
abnormal accruals when a company is an accelerated filer. Additionally, when a company is a large accelerated filer, the competitive 
distance between a small audit firm and its nearest large audit firm competitor (NB4_TO_B4) is negatively associated with abnormal 
accruals. A limitation of this analysis by filing type is that statistical power is reduced (ex. NB4_TO_NB4 is no longer significant in 
all filing types). In summary, the results from Table 4 demonstrate that in the large audit firm market, competitive distance is not 
associated with abnormal accruals; however, in the small audit firm market for firms with accelerated filer clients, evidence exists that 
competitive distance between small audit firms (NB4_TO_NB4) is negatively associated with abnormal accruals. Also, when an audit 
firm has large accelerated filer clients in a small audit market, a weak negative relationship exists between the competitive distance 
















Table 3  
Correlations 
Panel A: Local-Industry Large Audit Firm Abnormal Accruals Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 ABS_DACC_SIZE 1.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.18 -0.13 0.03 0.37 0.13 0.21 0.26 -0.10 0.18 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 
2 B4_TO_B4 -0.03 1.00 0.57 0.27 0.60 0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
3 B4_TO_NB4 -0.06 0.67 1.00 0.42 0.38 0.23 0.13 -0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.10 -0.04 
4 JOINT_SPEC -0.07 0.26 0.42 1.00 0.20 0.12 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.01 
5 HERF -0.03 0.73 0.47 0.19 1.00 0.01 0.07 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
6 SIZE -0.20 0.07 0.22 0.13 0.02 1.00 0.27 0.43 -0.34 0.36 -0.43 -0.14 0.19 -0.13 0.15 -0.15 -0.14 
7 LEV -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.13 1.00 0.00 -0.22 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.32 -0.18 0.08 0.02 -0.05 
8 CFO -0.19 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.39 -0.04 1.00 -0.15 0.25 -0.59 0.01 0.51 -0.14 0.04 -0.14 -0.10 
9 STDCFO 0.39 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.24 -0.08 -0.29 1.00 0.08 0.26 0.28 -0.10 0.23 -0.15 0.02 0.07 
10 MB 0.14 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.04 0.02 0.11 1.00 -0.13 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
11 LOSS 0.23 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.42 0.06 -0.56 0.24 -0.01 1.00 0.22 -0.52 0.21 -0.05 0.05 0.08 
12 ABSLTA 0.29 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.17 0.01 -0.16 0.42 0.08 0.24 1.00 -0.21 0.12 -0.07 0.00 0.02 
13 ZSCORE -0.23 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.24 -0.26 0.60 -0.20 -0.04 -0.48 -0.22 1.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 
14 LIT 0.19 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 0.24 0.07 0.21 0.14 -0.15 1.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 
15 TENURE -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 0.00 1.00 -0.08 -0.16 
16 AB_FEE 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.03 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 1.00 0.17 
17 MATWEAK 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.17 0.18 1.00 
                   





Panel B: Local-Industry Small Audit Firm Abnormal Accruals Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 ABS_DACC_SIZE 1.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -0.13 0.35 0.07 0.12 0.26 -0.19 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.10 
2 NB4_TO_NB4 -0.09 1.00 0.20 0.38 0.11 0.33 0.11 0.13 -0.16 0.04 -0.08 -0.11 0.12 -0.07 0.03 0.23 -0.03 0.29 
3 NB4_TO_B4 0.03 0.11 1.00 0.11 0.28 -0.13 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.14 
4 SPEC_MSA -0.04 0.74 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.13 
5 HERF 0.01 0.03 0.61 -0.02 1.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.08 
6 SIZE -0.12 0.24 -0.10 0.13 -0.11 1.00 0.03 0.28 -0.16 0.45 -0.26 -0.13 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.33 
7 LEV 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 0.11 0.06 -0.27 -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 
8 CFO -0.26 0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.19 -0.10 1.00 -0.22 0.07 -0.58 -0.12 0.47 -0.15 0.09 -0.05 -0.12 0.13 
9 STDCFO 0.31 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.28 1.00 0.11 0.15 0.37 -0.21 0.08 -0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.14 
10 MB 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.20 -0.07 -0.07 0.09 1.00 -0.10 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.07 
11 LOSS 0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.27 0.16 -0.49 0.13 0.02 1.00 0.19 -0.54 0.12 -0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.08 
12 ABSLTA 0.27 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.21 0.50 0.06 0.14 1.00 -0.31 0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.08 
13 ZSCORE -0.23 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.27 -0.27 0.47 -0.21 -0.05 -0.40 -0.23 1.00 -0.09 0.03 -0.20 -0.08 0.11 
14 LIT 0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.15 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.06 -0.09 1.00 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
15 TENURE -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 -0.13 0.11 
16 AB_FEE -0.03 0.20 -0.10 0.13 -0.13 0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 1.00 0.04 0.26 
17 MATWEAK 0.09 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.08 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.04 1.00 -0.05 
18 TIER2 -0.11 0.18 -0.12 0.13 -0.10 0.33 -0.01 0.12 -0.12 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.25 -0.05 1.00 
                    




Panel C: Local-Industry Large Audit Firm Restatement Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 RESTATE 1.00 0.69 0.68 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
2 BIGR 0.69 1.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
3 LITTLER 0.68 -0.06 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
4 B4_TO_B4 0.00 0.00 -0.01 1.00 0.57 0.25 0.60 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 
5 B4_TO_NB4 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.68 1.00 0.40 0.37 0.22 0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.11 
6 JOINT_SPEC 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.40 1.00 0.18 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.05 
7 HERF -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.73 0.47 0.16 1.00 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 
8 SIZE 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.28 -0.48 0.33 0.52 0.31 0.37 
9 LEV 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.13 1.00 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.19 0.04 
10 LOSS -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.47 0.04 1.00 -0.14 -0.83 -0.24 -0.28 
11 MB -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.16 -0.10 -0.03 1.00 0.24 -0.08 0.00 
12 ROA 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.48 -0.05 -0.65 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.30 
13 LOG_SEG 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.34 0.08 -0.26 -0.06 0.27 1.00 0.24 
14 FOREIGN 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.37 -0.04 -0.28 -0.03 0.34 0.24 1.00 
15 MERGER 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.28 0.02 -0.23 -0.03 0.23 0.18 0.26 
16 ARINV 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.17 -0.07 0.22 0.25 0.26 
17 FIN -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.11 0.30 0.21 0.06 -0.36 -0.15 -0.24 
18 EPR 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.45 0.04 -0.49 0.05 0.66 0.24 0.27 
19 FREEC 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.39 -0.09 -0.53 0.01 0.73 0.26 0.38 
20 MATWEAK 0.29 0.33 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 
21 FIRMSIZE_F 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 0.05 -0.19 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.03 
22 CLIENT_IMP. 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.27 0.08 -0.12 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.17 
23 GC -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.28 0.01 0.22 -0.04 -0.44 -0.13 -0.16 
24 TENURE -0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10 
25 AB_FEE 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.15 0.05 -0.13 
26 LRESTATE 0.61 0.54 0.29 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 
                




    15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 RESTATE 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.61 
2 BIGR 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.33 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.14 0.07 0.54 
3 LITTLER 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.29 
4 B4_TO_B4 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.01 
5 B4_TO_NB4 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.00 
6 JOINT_SPEC 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 
7 HERF -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.19 0.18 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
8 SIZE 0.29 0.02 0.09 0.44 0.42 -0.14 0.04 0.45 -0.25 0.11 -0.17 0.02 
9 LEV 0.09 -0.01 0.36 0.31 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.26 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 
10 LOSS -0.23 -0.21 0.09 -0.64 -0.59 0.09 0.00 -0.20 0.22 -0.06 0.07 0.00 
11 MB -0.01 -0.09 0.17 -0.08 0.22 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 
12 ROA 0.18 0.23 -0.13 0.63 0.70 -0.10 0.00 0.17 -0.25 0.05 -0.12 -0.01 
13 LOG_SEG 0.17 0.28 -0.05 0.34 0.17 -0.04 0.05 0.25 -0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 
14 FOREIGN 0.26 0.32 -0.13 0.30 0.34 -0.01 -0.03 0.34 -0.16 0.11 -0.14 0.05 
15 MERGER 1.00 0.14 0.00 0.25 0.26 -0.01 0.01 0.23 -0.12 0.02 -0.07 0.04 
16 ARINV 0.09 1.00 -0.17 0.32 0.20 0.04 -0.03 0.20 -0.09 0.04 0.18 0.03 
17 FIN -0.10 -0.16 1.00 -0.04 -0.20 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.01 
18 EPR 0.22 0.19 -0.14 1.00 0.49 -0.12 -0.02 0.29 -0.23 0.11 -0.06 0.00 
19 FREEC 0.26 0.24 -0.53 0.48 1.00 -0.09 0.01 0.16 -0.23 0.07 -0.12 0.01 
20 MATWEAK -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.16 0.17 0.29 
21 FIRMSIZE_F 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00 -0.58 -0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.02 
22 CLIENT_IMP. 0.13 0.07 -0.04 0.12 0.09 -0.01 -0.56 1.00 -0.09 0.08 0.20 0.06 
23 GC -0.12 -0.07 0.16 -0.42 -0.32 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 
24 TENURE 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.08 -0.17 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 1.00 -0.09 -0.06 
25 AB_FEE -0.07 0.16 0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.06 1.00 0.08 
26 LRESTATE 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 
 
1.00 
              




Panel D: Local-Industry Small Audit Firm Restatement Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 RESTATE 1.00 0.81 0.55 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 
2 BIGR 0.81 1.00 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
3 LITTLER 0.55 -0.04 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
4 NB4_TO_NB4 0.02 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.16 0.33 0.10 0.35 0.14 -0.19 0.12 0.27 0.23 0.24 
5 NB4_TO_B4 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09 1.00 0.08 0.26 -0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 
6 SPEC_MSA 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.75 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.14 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.10 
7 HERF 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.58 -0.03 1.00 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 
8 SIZE 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.25 -0.13 0.13 -0.13 1.00 0.05 -0.32 0.46 0.40 0.19 0.34 
9 LEV 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.12 1.00 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.21 0.04 
10 LOSS 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.13 0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.33 0.14 1.00 -0.16 -0.84 -0.22 -0.23 
11 MB -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.10 -0.08 -0.04 1.00 0.27 0.06 0.07 
12 ROA -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.23 -0.22 -0.20 0.20 1.00 0.33 0.29 
13 LOG_SEG 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.11 -0.01 0.23 -0.03 -0.23 0.05 0.25 1.00 0.22 
14 FOREIGN -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.18 -0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.34 -0.08 -0.23 0.02 0.13 0.23 1.00 
15 MERGER 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.27 -0.05 -0.16 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.22 
16 ARINV 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 0.01 0.13 0.31 0.18 
17 FIN 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.13 0.41 0.22 -0.18 -0.47 -0.21 -0.16 
18 EPR -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.45 -0.11 -0.30 0.04 0.22 0.15 0.15 
19 FREEC -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.13 -0.16 -0.20 0.20 0.46 0.26 0.14 
20 MATWEAK 0.20 0.21 0.05 -0.06 0.08 -0.03 0.05 -0.21 0.10 0.17 -0.08 -0.21 -0.11 -0.11 
21 FIRMSIZE_F -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.11 -0.19 0.04 -0.17 0.28 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.19 
22 CLIENT_IMP 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.15 0.00 0.14 -0.15 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 
23 GC 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.16 0.12 -0.09 0.11 -0.46 0.21 0.38 -0.15 -0.35 -0.33 -0.27 
24 TENURE -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 
25 AB_FEE -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 -0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.15 0.18 0.14 -0.10 -0.34 -0.07 -0.13 
26 LRESTATE 0.48 0.44 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.00 
27 TIER2 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.22 -0.12 0.15 -0.10 0.36 -0.05 -0.17 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.23 
                





    15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1 RESTATE 0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.20 -0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.48 -0.01 
2 BIGR 0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 0.21 -0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.44 -0.03 
3 LITTLER 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.03 
4 NB4_TO_NB4 0.14 0.16 -0.05 0.25 0.28 -0.12 0.25 -0.16 -0.27 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.34 
5 NB4_TO_B4 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 -0.21 0.17 0.11 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.14 
6 SPEC_MSA 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.15 
7 HERF -0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.11 0.09 0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.09 
8 SIZE 0.28 -0.03 0.13 0.47 0.27 -0.20 0.28 -0.13 -0.45 0.01 -0.11 0.03 0.37 
9 LEV 0.11 0.10 0.28 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
10 LOSS -0.16 -0.24 0.24 -0.71 -0.58 0.17 -0.12 0.06 0.38 -0.07 0.13 0.04 -0.17 
11 MB 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.22 0.16 -0.17 0.09 -0.06 -0.35 0.02 -0.16 -0.03 0.12 
12 ROA 0.20 0.31 -0.34 0.75 0.73 -0.24 0.18 -0.11 -0.57 0.08 -0.24 -0.04 0.23 
13 LOG_SEG 0.19 0.40 -0.10 0.28 0.34 -0.10 0.13 -0.02 -0.31 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.13 
14 FOREIGN 0.22 0.23 -0.10 0.29 0.32 -0.11 0.19 -0.07 -0.27 0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.23 
15 MERGER 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.23 -0.05 0.14 -0.05 -0.19 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.18 
16 ARINV 0.04 1.00 -0.20 0.27 0.34 -0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.22 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 
17 FIN -0.11 -0.13 1.00 -0.20 -0.46 0.11 -0.03 0.05 0.21 -0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.05 
18 EPR 0.11 0.07 -0.11 1.00 0.62 -0.19 0.15 -0.07 -0.49 0.07 -0.21 -0.03 0.21 
19 FREEC 0.08 0.17 -0.47 0.09 1.00 -0.23 0.18 -0.10 -0.50 0.10 -0.16 -0.02 0.23 
20 MATWEAK -0.05 -0.03 0.18 -0.13 -0.20 1.00 -0.13 0.14 0.34 -0.15 0.10 0.20 -0.14 
21 FIRMSIZE_F 0.14 0.05 -0.11 0.08 0.12 -0.13 1.00 -0.90 -0.24 0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.46 
22 CLIENT_IMP -0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.13 -0.89 1.00 0.17 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.40 
23 GC -0.19 -0.14 0.36 -0.34 -0.34 0.34 -0.24 0.18 1.00 -0.10 0.17 0.05 -0.25 
24 TENURE 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.15 0.04 -0.05 -0.10 1.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.13 
25 AB_FEE -0.07 -0.04 0.25 -0.14 -0.16 0.12 0.07 -0.04 0.19 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.15 
26 LRESTATE -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.20 -0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.01 1.00 0.01 
27 TIER2 0.18 0.00 -0.13 0.12 0.12 -0.14 0.46 -0.38 -0.25 0.13 0.12 0.01 1.00 
               




Panel E: Local-Industry Large Audit Firm Going Concern Opinion Sample 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 GC 1.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.26 -0.08 0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.02 -0.27 0.02 
2 B4_TO_B4 0.01 1.00 0.60 0.26 0.56 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 
3 B4_TO_NB4 0.00 0.72 1.00 0.38 0.34 0.18 0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 
4 JOINT_SPEC -0.03 0.23 0.37 1.00 0.16 0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 
5 HERF 0.02 0.69 0.45 0.14 1.00 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.06 
6 SIZE -0.27 0.01 0.14 0.09 -0.05 1.00 0.29 0.14 -0.28 -0.28 -0.10 0.22 -0.19 
7 MB -0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.17 1.00 -0.04 0.13 0.21 -0.01 -0.19 0.34 
8 DEBT 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.10 1.00 -0.23 -0.15 0.07 -0.32 -0.36 
9 LOSS_GC 0.13 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.27 0.08 -0.16 1.00 0.61 -0.02 -0.37 0.47 
10 LLOSS_GC 0.15 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.28 0.12 -0.08 0.61 1.00 -0.05 -0.42 0.51 
11 STDSALE 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 1.00 0.07 -0.06 
12 ZSCORE -0.32 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.24 -0.03 -0.29 -0.27 -0.33 0.01 1.00 -0.32 
 
13 CASH 0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.07 -0.20 0.18 -0.24 0.46 0.50 -0.05 -0.29 1.00 
14 MATWEAK 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.10 
15 LOG_SEG -0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.19 -0.04 0.14 -0.26 -0.26 0.10 0.12 -0.34 
16 LOG_GEO -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 0.15 -0.08 -0.04 -0.19 -0.24 0.06 0.23 -0.34 
17 CLIENT_IMPORTANCE -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.19 -0.03 0.10 -0.20 -0.19 -0.03 0.07 -0.17 
18 LGC 0.42 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.17 -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.01 -0.31 0.05 
19 REPORT_LAG 0.25 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 -0.40 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.02 -0.19 0.05 
20 CUMRET -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.23 0.16 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 
21 STD_RET 0.20 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.27 -0.01 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.05 -0.27 0.15 
22 TENURE -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.06 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 
23 AB_FEE 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.20 -0.04 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.12 -0.18 -0.08 
               














































14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 GC 0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 0.42 0.24 -0.16 0.19 -0.03 0.13 
2 B4_TO_B4 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00 
3 B4_TO_NB4 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.05 
4 JOINT_SPEC -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.03 
5 HERF -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.14 0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.03 
6 SIZE -0.04 0.19 0.14 0.32 -0.16 -0.40 0.37 -0.27 0.12 -0.23 
7 MB -0.07 -0.14 -0.15 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.39 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 
8 DEBT 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.08 
9 LOSS_GC 0.00 -0.27 -0.18 -0.30 0.09 0.14 -0.08 0.21 -0.10 0.01 
10 LLOSS_GC -0.02 -0.27 -0.24 -0.29 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.22 -0.11 0.03 
11 STDSALE 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.12 
12 ZSCORE 0.04 0.17 0.28 0.14 -0.21 -0.22 0.07 -0.29 -0.05 -0.14 
13 CASH -0.09 -0.35 -0.29 -0.36 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.15 -0.07 -0.07 
14 MATWEAK 1.00 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.20 -0.05 0.00 -0.17 0.21 
15 LOG_SEG 0.07 1.00 0.27 0.20 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 -0.14 0.07 0.08 
16 LOG_GEO 0.07 0.30 1.00 0.27 -0.11 -0.33 0.00 -0.16 0.05 0.10 
17 CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.02 0.07 0.11 1.00 -0.02 -0.19 0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.18 
18 LGC 0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 1.00 0.17 -0.03 0.16 0.00 0.10 
19 REPORT_LAG 0.25 -0.08 -0.27 -0.08 0.15 1.00 -0.10 0.21 -0.06 0.17 
20 CUMRET -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.09 
21 STD_RET -0.01 -0.12 -0.16 -0.06 0.20 0.20 0.23 1.00 -0.07 0.08 
22 TENURE -0.17 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.06 1.00 -0.06 
 23 AB_FEE 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.18 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 
 
1.00 
            




Panel F: Local-Industry Small Audit Firm Going Concern Opinion Sample 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 GC 1.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.22 -0.06 0.24 0.15 0.16 -0.04 -0.32 -0.05 
2 NB4_TO_NB4 -0.02 1.00 0.20 0.36 0.10 0.20 -0.04 0.06 -0.13 -0.14 0.03 0.16 -0.09 
3 NB4_TO_B4 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.14 0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.10 
4 SPEC_MSA 0.01 0.71 0.03 1.00 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 
5 HERF 0.01 0.03 0.54 -0.02 1.00 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.06 0.05 
6 SIZE -0.23 0.14 -0.12 0.04 -0.11 1.00 0.39 -0.05 -0.20 -0.13 -0.15 0.07 0.17 
7 MB -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.19 1.00 -0.05 0.08 0.20 -0.07 -0.25 0.31 
8 DEBT 0.32 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 1.00 -0.12 -0.06 0.16 -0.31 -0.34 
9 LOSS_GC 0.15 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.21 0.07 -0.05 1.00 0.48 -0.06 -0.33 0.27 
10 LLOSS_GC 0.16 -0.14 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.14 0.13 0.01 0.48 1.00 -0.09 -0.40 0.33 
11 STDSALE 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.18 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 -0.06 1.00 0.12 -0.14 
12 ZSCORE -0.32 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.13 -0.30 -0.24 -0.29 0.08 1.00 -0.27 
 
13 CASH -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.17 0.19 -0.21 0.26 0.32 -0.14 -0.34 1.00 
14 MATWEAK 0.11 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 
15 LOG_SEG -0.11 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.07 -0.19 -0.19 0.12 0.20 -0.34 
16 LOG_GEO -0.12 0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.15 -0.07 -0.03 -0.15 -0.16 0.02 0.23 -0.18 
17 CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.09 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.19 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
18 LGC 0.44 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.17 0.02 -0.34 0.07 
19 REPORT_LAG 0.24 -0.04 0.11 0.02 0.05 -0.41 -0.04 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.08 -0.10 -0.14 
20 CUMRET -0.12 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.27 0.12 -0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.11 
21 STD_RET 0.20 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.02 -0.25 0.10 
22 TENURE -0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.10 
23 AB_FEE 0.06 0.14 -0.08 0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.12 -0.06 
24 TIER2 -0.13 0.13 -0.13 0.10 -0.12 0.22 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 0.14 -0.08 
               







14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 GC 0.11 -0.10 -0.12 0.08 0.44 0.26 -0.18 0.21 -0.07 0.06 -0.13 
2 NB4_TO_NB4 0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.05 0.18 0.25 
3 NB4_TO_B4 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.19 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.12 
4 SPEC_MSA -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.10 
5 HERF 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 
6 SIZE -0.04 0.01 0.16 -0.03 -0.08 -0.45 0.35 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.22 
7 MB -0.07 -0.17 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.31 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
8 DEBT 0.11 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.13 -0.08 0.12 -0.01 0.07 0.01 
9 LOSS_GC -0.01 -0.19 -0.15 -0.01 0.12 0.11 -0.13 0.12 0.00 0.09 -0.10 
10 LLOSS_GC -0.03 -0.19 -0.16 0.01 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.21 -0.07 0.07 -0.13 
11 STDSALE 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 
12 ZSCORE 0.02 0.22 0.25 -0.04 -0.29 -0.12 0.09 -0.32 0.06 -0.15 0.13 
13 CASH -0.10 -0.30 -0.08 0.00 0.05 -0.20 0.12 0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 
14 MATWEAK 1.00 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.22 -0.08 0.06 -0.11 0.05 0.02 
15 LOG_SEG 0.06 1.00 0.21 0.08 -0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.07 
16 LOG_GEO 0.00 0.24 1.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.25 0.04 -0.16 -0.05 0.11 0.20 
17 CLIENT_IMPORTANCE 0.11 0.08 -0.02 1.00 0.08 0.17 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.34 
18 LGC 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.09 1.00 0.15 -0.01 0.20 -0.10 0.04 -0.11 
19 REPORT_LAG 0.24 0.04 -0.24 0.20 0.14 1.00 -0.15 0.20 -0.05 -0.01 -0.23 
20 CUMRET -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.07 1.00 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.02 
21 STD_RET 0.04 -0.10 -0.16 0.06 0.24 0.19 0.23 1.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 
22 TENURE -0.11 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.05 0.16 
23 AB_FEE 0.06 0.03 0.11 -0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 1.00 0.24 
 
24 TIER2 0.02 0.08 0.20 -0.33 -0.11 -0.22 0.01 -0.08 0.15 0.24 
 
1.00 
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. Pearson correlations are below the diagonal; Spearman correlations are above the diagonal. Bold 







Panel A: Local-Industry Abnormal Accruals Samples 




Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
 Coeff. P-Value  Coeff.      P-Value 
INTERCEPT  0.046 (0.000) *** 0.152 (0.000) *** 








NB4_TO_NB4 +/- - - 
 
-0.062 (0.010) ** 
















SIZE - -0.003 (0.000) *** -0.002 (0.094) * 
LEV - -0.009 (0.064) * -0.003 (0.761) 
 
CFO - 0.026 (0.013) ** -0.064 (0.000) *** 
STD_CFO + 0.159 (0.000) *** 0.054 (0.000) *** 
MB + 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.602) 
 
LOSS + 0.010 (0.000) *** -0.012 (0.001) *** 
ABS_LTA + 0.057 (0.000) *** 0.035 (0.000) *** 
Z_SCORE - -0.003 (0.000) *** -0.002 (0.001) *** 
LIT + 0.012 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.505) 
 




AB_FEE +/- -0.001 (0.655) 
 
-0.005 (0.070) * 
MAT_WEAK + 0.003 (0.098) * 0.008 (0.028) ** 




Industry and Year 
Fixed Effects 
 Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.2335 0.1767 
N  11,302 4,758 
    
(Table 4: cont’d.) 
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Panel B: Local-Industry Abnormal Accruals Samples 
 Dependent Variable: ABS_DACC_SIZE 
  Large Sample Small Sample 
  Large Acc. Acc. Non-Acc. Large Acc. Acc. Non-Acc. 
 Coeff.      P-Value                 Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.      P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.023 (0.009) *** 0.037 (0.007) *** 0.142 (0.003) *** 0.172 (0.000) *** 0.115 (0.000) *** 0.147 (0.000) *** 




-0.014 (0.415) - -  - -  - - 




 0.006 (0.677) - -  - -  - - 




- -   -0.011 (0.834) 
 
-0.092 (0.006) *** -0.041 (0.282) 
 






















- -   0.004 (0.803) 
 
0.024 (0.054) * -0.005 (0.779) 
 










SIZE -0.002 (0.005) *** -0.002 (0.142) 
 














CFO 0.088 (0.000) *** 0.005 (0.747)  -0.062 (0.012) ** 0.020 (0.734)  -0.064 (0.019) ** -0.073 (0.000) *** 
STD_CFO 0.185 (0.000) *** 0.142 (0.000) *** 0.098 (0.000) *** 0.111 (0.128) 
 
0.055 (0.025) ** 0.049 (0.000) *** 
MB 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.002) *** 0.001 (0.136) 
 
0.003 (0.020) ** 0.001 (0.039) ** -0.001 (0.246) 
 




0.020 (0.121)   -0.014 (0.016) ** -0.015 (0.003) *** 




0.046 (0.001) *** 0.027 (0.001) *** 
Z_SCORE -0.000 (0.600) 
 
-0.003 (0.000) *** -0.004 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.407)   -0.001 (0.330) 
 
-0.002 (0.000) *** 
LIT 0.016 (0.000) *** 0.003 (0.482) 
 




TENURE -0.001 (0.362) 
 




AB_FEE -0.004 (0.027) ** 0.003 (0.239) 
 
0.005 (0.337)   0.004 (0.632)   -0.010 (0.024) ** -0.003 (0.438) 
 
MAT_WEAK 0.005 (0.143)   0.003 (0.363) 
 
0.003 (0.636)   0.005 (0.768)   0.011 (0.071) * 0.008 (0.093) * 





















      
                                      
R-squared 0.2736 0.2106 0.2882  0.3128 0.1906  0.1836  
                                      
N 6,361  3,806  1,135 483   1,502 2,773  
In this table, an OLS regression is used to test if a relationship exists between the absolute value of abnormal accruals and competitive distances. The dependent variable is the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE), and the variables of interest are competitive distances (B4_TO_B4, B4_TO_NB4, NB4_TO_NB4, and 
NB4_TO_B4). The sample period is 2004-2015.  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on t-statistics using robust standard errors, clustered by company. 




 DeFond and Zhang (2014) recommend using audit quality measures that are at opposing ends of the “egregiousness” scale to 
understand the magnitude of the relationship between audit quality and the variables of interest. Abnormal accruals are considered less 
egregious since they are linked to within GAAP earnings manipulation. On the other hand, a restatement is a more direct measure of 
audit quality and suggests that the original financial statement audit was of poorer quality (Palmrose and Scholz 2004). Restatements 
are more egregious because they indicate that the auditor erroneously issued an unqualified opinion on financial statements that were 
materially misstated. While restatements have a low measurement error and provide clear indication of poor audit quality, 
restatements also have a few disadvantages. Restatements are relatively rare, and the absence of a restatement does not necessarily 
imply better audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
RESTATE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a client restated their financial statements for that particular 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Quarterly restatements and restatements that are due to clerical error are excluded (Lobo and Zhao 
2013). Additionally, restatements can be broken down into “Big R” and “Little r” restatements. A Big R restatement requires a 
reissuance of the audit opinion and is reported on an 8-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conversely, a 
Little r restatement often consists of prior period errors that are corrected in the current financial statements and does not require 
reissuance of the audit opinion or an 8-K filing (Tan and Young 2015; Hogan and Jonas 2016). BIG_R is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the restatement is reported on an 8-K, and zero otherwise. LITTLE_R is an indicator variable set to 1 if the restatement is not 
reported on an 8-K, and zero otherwise.  
A logistic regression is used to test the relationship between competitive distance and restatements following control 
variables based on Romanus, Maher, and Fleming (2008), Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor (2012), Lobo and Zhao (2013), and Bills et 
al. (2016). Industry and year fixed effects are included, and heteroskedasticity is controlled by using robust standard errors clustered 
by company. Restatements are further broken down into Big R and Little r, and the models are re-estimated to see if a particular 
restatement is driving the results. Finally, Equations (3a) and (3b) are run using the full sample, and then, regressions are run 
separately based on a company’s filing status (large accelerated, accelerated, and non-accelerated). 
RESTATEi,t =β1B4_TO_B4i,t +β2B4_TO_NB4i,t +β3JOINT_SPECi,t +β4HERFi,t +β5SIZEi,t +β6LEVi,t +β7LOSSi,t +β8MBi,t 
                                   +β9ROAi,t +β10LOG_SEGi,t +β11FOREIGNi,t +β12MERGERi,t +β13ARINVi,t +β14FINi,t +β15EPRi,t  +β16FREECi,t 
                                   +β17MAT_WEAKi,t +β18FIRM_SIZEi,t +β19CLIENT_IMPORTANCEi,t +β20GCi,t +β21TENUREi,t 
                                   +β22AB_FEEi,t+β23LRESTATEi,t-1 +Industry and Year fixed effectsi,t +ɛi,t            (3a) 
 
RESTATEi,t =β1NB4_TO_NB4i,t + β2NB4_TO_B4i,t + β3SPECi,t +β4HERFi,t +β5SIZEi,t +β6LEVi,t +β7LOSSi,t +β8MBi,t 
                    +β9ROAi,t +β10LOG_SEGi,t +β11FOREIGNi,t +β12MERGERi,t +β13ARINVi,t +β14FINi,t +β15EPRi,t  +β16FREECi,t 
                    +β17MAT_WEAKi,t +β18FIRM_SIZEi,t +β19CLIENT_IMPORTANCEi,t +β20GCi,t +β21TENUREi,t +β22AB_FEEi,t 
                    +β23LRESTATEI,t-1 + β24TIER_2i,t + Industry and Year fixed effectsi,t +ɛi,t                                       (3b) 
 
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. Note, when the equation is run to test the association between audit quality and 
local competitive distance (ignoring industry), B4_TO_B4 is replaced with B4_TO_B4_MSA and B4_TO_NB4 is replaced by 
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B4_TO_NB4_MSA for the large audit firm sample in Equation (3a). For the small audit firm sample at the local level, NB4_TO_B4 is 
replaced by NB4_TO_B4_MSA and NB4_TO_NB4 is replaced by NB4_TO_NB4_MSA in Equation (3b). Also, HERF is replaced by 
HERF_MSA for Equations (3a) and (3b).  See Section 5.  
Equation (3a) addresses Hypotheses 1 and 2 in relation to competitive distance and large audit firm quality. The variables of 
interest are B4_TO_B4 (H1) and B4_TO_NB4 (H2). A negative sign on B4_TO_B4 indicates that as competitive distance between 
two large audit firms decreases (more competition), the likelihood of restatement increases. On the other hand, a positive coefficient 
on B4_TO_B4 signifies that as competitive distance between two large audit firms decreases, the likelihood of restatements decreases 
(higher audit quality). Hypothesis 2 examines if large audit firm quality is related to competitive distance between large and small 
audit firms. A negative sign on B4_TO_NB4 provides evidence that decreasing competitive distance between the audit firms is related 
to a greater likelihood of restatement and lower audit quality. However, if the sign on B4_TO_NB4 is positive, then decreasing 
competitive distance between the audit firms leads to a lower likelihood of restatement for large audit firms and better audit quality.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested in Equation (3b), and the variables of interest are NB4_TO_NB4 (H3) and NB4_TO_B4 (H4). 
Hypothesis 3 states that within the small audit firm market, the competitive distance between two small audit firms is not associated 
with audit quality. A negative sign on NB4_TO_NB4 indicates that decreasing competitive distance between two small audit firms is 
associated with a greater likelihood of restatement (poorer audit quality).  A positive sign on NB4_TO_NB4 demonstrates that 
decreasing competitive distance between two small audit firms is associated with a lower likelihood of restatement (higher audit 
quality). For Hypothesis 4, a negative sign on NB4_TO_B4 implies that a decrease in competitive distance is associated with a higher 
likelihood of restatement.  A positive sign on NB4_TO_B4 supports the concept that competition does not impair auditor 
independence, and competition leads to higher audit quality (lower likelihood of restatement).  
Firms that are likely to partake in earnings management are also more likely to restate. Therefore, the restatement model in 
Equations (3a) and (3b) has several control variables in common with the abnormal accruals models in Equations (2a) and (2b). 
HERF, JOINT_SPEC, SPEC, and TIER_2 are included to control for other aspects of competition (Newton et al. 2013; Numan and 
Willekens 2014). The size of the company (SIZE) is in the model because larger companies face higher levels of scrutiny from 
regulators (Balsam et al. 2003), and SIZE is predicted to have a negative coefficient. A positive relationship between RESTATE and 
leverage (LEV) is expected, as Jaggi and Lee (2002) provide support that companies with debt constraints manage earnings upwards. 
Also, control variables related to capital markets are in the restatement models based on the findings of Richardson et al. (2002) about 
predicting earnings management. These variables include MB, FIN, EPR, and FREEC, and they are predicted to have positive 
coefficients. FREEC is a measure of free cash flow calculated as operating cash flow less average capital expenditures for the current 
year and prior year scaled by lagged total assets. Equations (3a) and (3b) also contain control variables related to the complexity of the 
company (LOG_SEG, FOREIGN, and MERGER). Ge and McVay (2005) and Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007a) find evidence that 
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complexity is related to lower quality financial reporting. Thus, positive coefficients are projected for the complexity variables. ROA, 
LOSS, and GC are included to control for financial performance as prior literature has found mixed relationships between these 
variables and financial reporting quality (Kinney and McDaniel 1989; Beasley 1996; Summers and Sweeney 1998; Erickson, Hanlon, 
and Maydew 2006). Previous studies have found a positive relationship between accounts receivable-inventory ratio and fraudulent 
reporting (Feroz, Park, and Pastena 1991; Summers and Sweeney 1998), so a positive coefficient is expected for ARINV. Audit tenure 
(TENURE) is a control variable because longer tenure may lead to a conflict of interest between an auditor and its client. 
MAT_WEAK is included because this variable provides insight into a company’s internal control system. MAT_WEAK  is expected 
to have a positive coefficient because if a company has poor internal controls, it is likely to have poor financial reporting quality 
(Feldmann, Read, and Abdolmohammadi 2009). Also, audit firm size (FIRM_SIZE) and client importance to the audit firm 
(CLIENT_IMPORTANCE) are control variables. A negative coefficient is predicted for FIRM_SIZE given that Francis and Yu 
(2009) show that larger audit offices are associated with higher audit quality. A positive coefficient on CLIENT_IMPORTANCE is 
expected since a client’s influence can lead to independence issues with their auditors. AB_FEE controls for additional audit effort 
(Numan and Willekens 2012; Newton et al. 2013). Additionally, a lagged restatement control variable (LRESTATE) is found in the 
model, following Lobo and Zhao (2013). Lastly, industry and year fixed effects are done to control for any systematic time and 
industry effects.  
The descriptive statistics for Equations (3a) and (3b) for the large and small audit firm samples associated with local-industry 
competitive distances are displayed in Table 2: Panel B. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  The 
large audit firm restatement sample consists of 9,813 observations, and the small audit firm restatement sample consists of 5,572 
observations. B4_TO_B4 has a mean of 0.223, and B4_TO_NB4 has a mean of 0.318, which are similar to Bills and Stephens (2016) 
0.227 for B4_TO_B4 and 0.321 for B4_TO_NB4. The means for NB4_TO_NB4 and NB4_TO_B4 are 0.039 and 0.191, respectively. 
The means reported by Bills and Stephens (2016) are 0.031 for NB4_TO_NB4 and 0.162 for NB4_TO_B4. In the large audit firm 
sample, 11.2% of companies restate their financial statements (5.7% Big R and 5.5% Little r), and in the small audit firm sample, 
8.9% of companies restate their financial statements (6.1% Big R and 2.8% Little r). HERF, SIZE, LEV, LOG_SEG, FIN, 
MAT_WEAK, FIRM_SIZE, CLIENT_IMPORTANCE, GC, and JOINT_SPEC are control variables in the large audit sample that 
have means comparable to other studies such as Cao, Myers, and Omer (2012),  Francis et al. (2013b), Bills and Stephens (2016), and 
Bills et al. (2016).  Compared to other studies, the means of LOSS, ROA, MERGER, EPR, FREEC, and TENURE are lower; while 
the means of MB and FOREIGN are higher. These variations may be from sample restrictions (Big 4 only) as well as differences in 
time periods. For the small audit firm sample, LEV, LOSS, MB, LOG_SEG, FOREIGN, MAT_WEAK, GC, and SPEC are similar to 
the means stated in Bills and Stephens (2016) and Bills et al. (2016), which are both studies with small audit firm samples covering 
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similar time periods. The remaining control variables vary somewhat from other studies since they do not cover similar time periods, 
have different sample selection techniques, or define the variables in a different manner. 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations among the variables are shown below (above) the diagonal in the correlation table, Table 3: 
Panels C and D. B4_TO_NB4 and B4_ TO_B4 have high correlation of 0.68 (Pearson) and 0.57 (Spearman) similar to the large audit 
firm abnormal accrual sample. For the large audit sample, the variables of interest (B4_TO_NB4 and B4_ TO_B4) are positively but 
not significantly related to the dependent variable for restatements (RESTATE). For the small audit sample, NB4_TO_NB4 and NB4_ 
TO_B4 are positively correlated with restatements (RESTATE).  
Table 5 displays the results of the logistic regressions for Equations (3a) and (3b) that regress RESTATE on the variables of 
interest and a set of control variables. The coefficients, p-values, and significance levels for the large audit firm sample are displayed 
in the first three columns, and the next three columns display the coefficients, p-values, and significance levels for the small audit firm 
sample. In the large audit firm sample, some control variables are in the wrong predicted direction; however, they are not significant. 
For the variables of interest, B4_ TO_B4 and B4_ TO_NB4 are not significant. These outcomes are in favor of the null hypotheses 
(H1 and H2) that competitive distances in the large audit firm market are not associated with audit quality as represented by 
restatements. In the small audit firm sample,  SIZE, MB, FOREIGN, and EPR are the control variables that load significantly in the 
wrong predicted direction. NB4_ TO_NB4 and NB4_ TO_B4 do not load significantly for the small audit firm sample. Thus, 
competitive distances in the small audit firm sample do not affect audit quality. 
The results of Equations (3a) and (3b) for the different filing types are shown in Table 5: Panel B. For the filing types in the 
large audit firm sample B4_ TO_B4 and B4_ TO_NB4 do not load significantly, demonstrating that competitive distance in the large 
audit market is not associated with the likelihood of restatement. The only exception is in the accelerated filers group, where weak 
evidence exists of a positive relationship between competitive distance between large and small audit firms and restatements (p < 
0.10).  In the small audit firm sample, the only coefficient that is significant (p < 0.05) is NB4_ TO_NB4 for the non-accelerated 
filers. NB4_ TO_B4 is not significant across any filing type. The negative coefficient on NB4_ TO_NB4 provides limited evidence 
that as the competitive distance between two small audit firms decreases, the likelihood of restatement increases.  
Additionally, Equations (3a) and (3b) are re-estimated by replacing the dependent variable, RESTATE, with BIG_R (Table 
5: Panel C) and LITTLE_R (Table 5: Panel D) to test whether competitive distance is related to certain types of restatements. For the 
large audit firm sample, the coefficients on B4_ TO_B4 and B4_ TO_NB4 are not significant in Panels C and D. Furthermore, in the 
small audit firm sample, the coefficients on NB4_ TO_NB4 and NB4_ TO_B4 are not significant. Overall, the majority of the 
restatement regressions (RESTATE, BIG_R, and LITTLE_R) do not support an association between competitive distance and the 




  Table 5  
Panel A: Local-Industry Restatement Samples 




Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
 Coeff.   P-Value Coeff.   P-Value 
INTERCEPT  -1.625 (0.000) *** -3.635 (0.000) *** 




























SIZE - -0.031 (0.316) 
 
0.101 (0.016) ** 
LEV + 0.366 (0.056) * 0.026 (0.787) 
 
LOSS +/- 0.036 (0.775) 
 
0.226 (0.076) * 
MB + 0.001 (0.920) 
 
-0.005 (0.056) * 








FOREIGN + -0.021 (0.846) 
 
-0.296 (0.063) * 
MERGER + 0.230 (0.013) ** 0.411 (0.002) *** 








EPR + 0.878 (0.002) *** -0.117 (0.080) * 




MAT_WEAK + 1.154 (0.000) *** 1.051 (0.000) *** 
















AB_FEE +/- -0.117 (0.177) 
 
-0.296 (0.001) *** 
LRESTATE + 3.557 (0.000) *** 2.884 (0.000) *** 
TIER_2 - - - 
 
-0.027 (0.863)  
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
 Yes Yes 
N  9,813 5,572 
    
(Table 5: cont’d.) 
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Panel B: Local-Industry Restatement Samples 
 Dependent Variable: RESTATE 
  Large Sample Small Sample 
  Large Acc. Acc. Non-Acc. Large Acc. Acc. Non-Acc. 
 Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.      P-Value Coeff.        P-Value Coeff.      P-Value 
Coeff.     P-
Value 




-3.511 (0.000) *** 












B4_TO_NB4 -0.123 (0.764) 
 


















-3.252 (0.034) ** 
































0.825 (0.080) * 




















-0.313 (0.008) *** 0.198 (0.001) *** 




















0.406 (0.016) ** 
















-1.215 (0.018) ** 1.996 (0.131) 
 
0.085 (0.015) ** -0.000 (0.956) 
 






2.977 (0.049) ** 0.058 (0.906) 
 
0.580 (0.039) ** 












MERGER 0.132 (0.301) 
 
0.344 (0.026) ** 0.229 (0.445) 
 
1.429 (0.019) ** 0.467 (0.048) ** 0.201 (0.319) 
 














3.802 (0.014) ** 0.987 (0.000) *** -0.039 (0.554) 
 
EPR 0.040 (0.955) 
 




-0.174 (0.018) ** 








0.242 (0.048) ** -0.042 (0.013) ** 
MAT_WEAK 1.484 (0.000) *** 0.960 (0.000) *** 1.454 (0.000) *** 2.864 (0.000) *** 1.206 (0.000) *** 1.048 (0.000) *** 






-0.195 (0.003) *** -0.062 (0.077) * -0.014 (0.474) 
 
                   




  Large Sample Small Sample 
  Large Acc. Acc. Non-Acc. Large Acc. Acc. Non-Acc. 
















































3.356 (0.000) *** 2.727 (0.000) *** 3.109 (0.002) *** 3.091 (0.000) *** 2.763 (0.000) *** 


























            
N 5,128   3,291   1,230   330   1,378   3,701   
             




Panel C: Local-Industry Restatement Samples 




Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
 Coeff.   P-Value Coeff.   P-Value 
INTERCEPT  0.496 (0.515) 
 
-4.754 (0.000) *** 




























SIZE - -0.108 (0.073) * 0.134 (0.010) ** 








MB + 0.033 (0.023) ** -0.007 (0.033) ** 
ROA +/- -1.093 (0.003) *** 0.015 (0.155) 
 




FOREIGN + 0.275 (0.103) 
 
-0.578 (0.006) *** 








FIN + 0.546 (0.092) * 0.076 (0.335) 
 
EPR + 0.796 (0.027) ** -0.078 (0.363) 
 




MAT_WEAK + 1.581 (0.000) *** 1.378 (0.000) *** 
FIRM_SIZE - 0.003 (0.005) *** -0.004 (0.808) 
 
CLIENT_IMPORTANC + -0.333 (0.565) 
 
0.426 (0.089) * 
GC +/- 0.279 (0.438) 
 
-0.402 (0.057) * 




AB_FEE +/- -0.284 (0.066) * -0.257 (0.020) ** 
LRESTATE + 4.171 (0.000) *** 2.836 (0.000) *** 
TIER_2 - - - 
 
-0.402 (0.062) * 








N  9,701 5,517 
    






























































Panel D: Local-Industry Restatement Samples 
 Dependent Variable: LITTLE_R 
  Predicted 
Sign 
Large Sample Small Sample 
 Full Sample Full Sample 




INTERCEPT  -2.717 (0.000) *** -4.613 (0.000) *** 








































MB + -0.028 (0.019) ** 0.001 (0.840) 
 












MERGER + 0.194 (0.104) 
 
0.625 (0.005) *** 




















FIRM_SIZE - -0.002 (0.066) * -0.036 (0.094) * 












AB_FEE +/- 0.033 (0.775) 
 
-0.258 (0.063) * 
LRESTATE + 2.394 (0.000) *** 1.996 (0.000) *** 
TIER_2 - - - 
 
0.582 (0.027) ** 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes   
N  9,684 5,449 
In this table, a logistic regression is used to test if a relationship exists between restatements and 
competitive distances. The dependent variables are RESTATE, BIG_R, and LITTLE_R for Panels A-
B, Panel C, and Panel D, respectively. The variables of interest are competitive distances (B4_TO_B4, 
B4_TO_NB4, NB4_TO_NB4, and NB4_TO_B4). The sample period is restricted to 2004-2013.  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on Wald Chi-squares using robust standard errors, 
clustered by company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
49 
 
4.3 Going Concern Opinions 
 
The final measure of audit quality is the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed companies. A going 
concern opinion is issued by an auditor to a client when an auditor has substantial doubt about the client’s ability to continue as a 
going concern for at least one operating cycle. A going concern opinion is costly for clients; consequently, managers pressure auditors 
to not issue a going concern opinion. If an auditor surrenders to the managers’ pressure and issues a clean opinion, this action is a 
violation of auditor independence and a signal of lower audit quality. Fewer issuances of going concern opinions is an indication of 
poorer audit quality. Going concern opinions provide strong evidence of audit quality because it is an output measure of auditor 
communication. However, going concern opinions also have limitations: it is not a continuous measure, it cannot detect subtle audit 
quality differences, and it has limited generalizability since it only applies to financially distressed firms (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
GC is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a company receives a going concern opinion in the current year, and zero 
otherwise. Because going concern opinions are relatively rare, the going concern sample is reduced to financially distressed 
companies to increase the power of the tests. Following prior research (DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Lim and Tan 
2008; Numan and Willekens 2014), financially distressed companies report either negative net income or negative operating cash 
flows during the current fiscal year. The logistic regression model below tests whether the likelihood of issuing a going concern 
opinion is associated with competitive distance. Industry and year fixed effects are included, and heteroskedasticity is controlled for 
by using robust standard errors clustered by company. Finally, Equations (4a) and (4b) are only estimated using the full sample due to 
the reduced sample size. 
GCi,t =β1B4_TO_B4i,t +β2B4_TO_NB4i,t +β3JOINT_SPECi,t +β4HERFi,t +β5SIZEi,t +β6MBi,t +β7DEBTi,t +β8LOSS_GCi,t 
         +β9L_LOSS_GCi,t-1 +β10STD_SALEi,t +β11Z_SCOREi,t +β12CASHi,t +β13CLIENT_IMPORTANCEi,t +β14L_GCi,t-1 
         +β15REPORT_LAGi,t +β16L_RETURNi,t-1 +β17STD_RETi,t +β18TENUREi,t +β19AB_FEEi,t +Industry and Year fixed 
          effectsi,t +ɛi,t                                                                                            (4a)  
 
GCi,t =β1NB4_TO_NB4i,t + β2NB4_TO_B4i,t + β3SPECi,t +β4HERFi,t +β5SIZEi,t +β6MBi,t +β7DEBTi,t +β8LOSS_GCi,t 
                       +β9L_LOSS_GCi,t-1 +β10STD_SALEi,t +β11Z_SCOREi,t +β12CASHi,t +β13CLIENT_IMPORTANCEi,t +β14L_GCi,t-1 
                       +β15REPORT_LAGi,t +β16L_RETURNi,t-1 +β17STD_RETi,t +β18TENUREi,t +β19AB_FEEi,t +β20TIER_2i,t +Industry and 
                       Year fixed effectsi,t +ɛi,t                                                                 (4b) 
  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. Note, when the equation is run to test the association between audit quality and 
local competitive distance (ignoring industry), B4_TO_B4 is replaced with B4_TO_B4_MSA and B4_TO_NB4 is replaced by 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA for the large audit firm sample in Equation (4a). For the small audit firm sample at the local level, NB4_TO_B4 is 
replaced by NB4_TO_B4_MSA and NB4_TO_NB4 is replaced by NB4_TO_NB4_MSA in Equation (4b). Also, HERF is replaced by 
HERF_MSA for Equations (4a) and (4b).  See Section 5. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are examined using Equation (4a), where the variables of interest are B4_TO_B4 (H1) and B4_TO_NB4 
(H2). A negative coefficient on B4_TO_B4 provides evidence that decreasing competitive distance between large audit firms is 
associated with higher audit quality (a greater likelihood of a going concern opinion). On the other hand, a positive coefficient on 
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B4_TO_B4 provides evidence that as competitive distance decreases between large audit firms, audit firms issue fewer going concern 
opinions (lower audit quality).  A negative coefficient on B4_TO_NB4 indicates that as competitive distance decreases between a 
large and a small audit firm, a going concern opinion is more likely to be issued (higher audit quality). However, a positive sign on 
B4_TO_NB4 implies that as competitive distance decreases between large and small audit firms, a going concern opinion is less likely 
to be issued (lower audit quality).  
The small audit firm samples relate to Hypotheses 3 and 4 and are tested using Equation (4b).  NB4_TO_NB4 (H3) and 
NB4_TO_B4 (H4) are the variables of interest. A negative coefficient on NB4_TO_NB4 suggests a greater likelihood of issuing a 
going concern opinion (higher audit quality) as competitive distance decreases between small audit firms. Alternatively, a positive 
coefficient on NB4_TO_NB4 suggests a lower likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion (lower audit quality) when competitive 
distance between two small audit firms decreases. A negative coefficient on NB4_TO_B4 suggests that as the competitive distance 
between small and large audit firms decreases, there is a greater likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion (higher audit quality). 
Lastly, a positive sign on NB4_TO_B4 denotes that decreasing competitive distance between small and large audit firms is associated 
with a lower likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion (lower audit quality).  
The control variables for Equations (4a) and (4b) are derived from the following studies: Francis and Yu (2009), Bills and 
Stephens (2016), and Numan and Willekens (2014). First, prior studies have examined the influence of competition on audit quality 
measures (Kallapur et al. 2010; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Boone et al. 2012; Numan and Willekens 2012; Francis et al. 2013a; Numan 
and Willekens 2014; Bills and Stephens 2016; Ettredge et al. 2017). Thus, variables linked to competition such as HERF, 
JOINT_SPEC, SPEC, and TIER_2 are control variables in the models. Larger companies are less likely to go bankrupt due to more 
resources and being at a more mature stage in the business life cycle (McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood 1991; Lim and Tan 2008), 
so the control variable, SIZE, is included and predicted to have a negative association with GC. Equations (4a) and (4b) contain 
several variables related to financial health of a company as well as riskiness of a company. Firms with losses (LOSS_GC, 
L_LOSS_GC) and higher amounts of debt are more likely to fail in the future and receive a going concern opinion, so these variables 
are expected to have a positive coefficient. Sales volatility (STD_SALE), market-to-book ratio (MB), and stock return volatility 
(STD_RET) represent the operating risk and the growth risk of a company. Companies with volatile sales, volatile stock returns, and 
growth are more likely to go bankrupt due to the unsteady nature of their business. These variables are projected to have positive 
coefficients. Z_SCORE measures the probability that a company will go bankrupt, the lower the score the higher the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Thus, it should be negatively related to GC (Altman 1983). The control variable CASH proxies for the liquidity of a 
company; the more liquid a company is the less likely it will fail. A negative relationship between CASH and GC is expected. If a 
company has received a going concern opinion in the prior year (L_GC), then the company has a higher likelihood of receiving 
another going concern opinion. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected on L_GC. L_RETURN proxies for the success of a company; 
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if a company has a higher prior year stock return, then it is less likely to receive a going concern opinion. REPORT_LAG  is a control 
variable because prior studies have found that a delay in reporting is associated with going concern opinions (DeFond et al. 2002). 
Client influence may also play a role on auditor’s independence and willingness to issue a going concern report, so 
CLIENT_IMPORTANCE is included in the models and predicted to be negatively associated with GC. Additionally, audit tenure 
(TENURE) is in the models because research studies debate if auditor tenure affects an auditor’s independence and their ability to 
provide a high quality audit. AB_FEE is used to control for additional audit effort. Lastly, industry and year fixed effects are included 
to control for any systematic time and industry effects.  
Table 2: Panel C reports the descriptive statistics for Equations (4a) and (4b) for the large and small audit firm samples 
associated with local-industry competitive distance. The sample sizes are 3,432 and 1,780 for the large and small audit firm samples, 
respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. B4_TO_B4 has a mean of 0.225 compared to 0.227 
for Bills and Stephens (2016), and B4_TO_NB4 has a mean of 0.308 compared to Bills and Stephens (2016) 0.321. The means for 
NB4_TO_NB4 and NB4_TO_B4 are 0.044 and 0.158, respectively. These means are comparable to Bills and Stephens (2016) means 
of 0.031 for NB4_TO_NB4 and 0.162 for NB4_TO_B4. In the large audit firm sample, 5.9% of financially distressed companies 
receive a going concern opinion, and 11.3% of financially distressed companies receive a going concern opinion in the small audit 
firm sample. The following means of the control variables in the large audit firm sample are consistent with prior studies: HERF, 
SIZE, DEBT, LOSS_GC, L_LOSS_GC, MAT_WEAK, CLIENT_IMPORTANCE, L_GC, REPORT_LAG, and JOINT_SPEC (Lim 
and Tan 2008; Francis and Yu 2009; Numan and Willekens 2014; Bills and Stephens 2016). Several variables have means that are 
higher than previous studies (MB, CASH, and STD_RET), and some variables have means that are lower than previous studies 
(STD_SALE, Z_SCORE, L_RETURN, and TENURE). For the small audit sample, HERF, SIZE, ME, DEBT, CASH, MAT_WEAK, 
and SPEC are similar to prior studies (Lim and Tan 2008; Francis and Yu 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Numan and Willekens 
2014; Bills et al. 2016; Bills and Stephens 2016). Other variables from the small audit firm sample differ from prior studies possibly 
due to timing issues or sample selection factors. 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations among the variables are shown below (above) the diagonal in the correlation table, Table 3: 
Panels E and F. B4_TO_B4 and B4_TO_NB4 are highly, positively correlated with each other.  B4_TO_B4 and B4_TO_NB4 are 
positively, but not significantly, correlated with going concern opinions (GC). In the small audit sample correlations, NB4_TO_B4 is 
positively, but not significantly, correlated with going concern opinions (GC).  NB4_TO_NB4 is significantly and negatively 
correlated to going concern opinions (GC) through Spearman correlations.  
Table 6 presents the logistic regression results from estimating Equations (4a) and (4b). Columns 1-3 and columns 4-6 report 
the coefficients, p-values, and significance levels for the large and small audit firm samples, respectively. The majority of the control 
variables load in their predicted direction; however, those variables that are not in their predicted direction are not significant. 
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B4_TO_B4 is used to test Hypothesis 1 related to competitive distance between large audit firms and audit quality as proxied by going 
concern opinions. The coefficient on B4_TO_B4 is not significant, suggesting that an association between competitive distance and 
the likelihood of a going concern opinion is not supported. Likewise, B4_TO_NB4 is also not significant. This result suggests that the 
competitive distance between a large audit firm and its nearest small audit firm competitor and the likelihood of a going concern 
opinion are not related. In the small audit firm sample, most of the control variables load in the appropriate direction, and the control 
variables that are not in the predicted direction are not significant. NB4_TO_NB4 and NB4_TO_B4 test if competitive distances in the 
small audit market are connected to audit quality as measured by going concern opinions. Neither variable of interest loads 
significantly, indicating that the likelihood of a going concern opinion is not associated with either competitive distance between small 
audit firms or competitive distance between a small audit firm and its nearest large audit firm competitor. Due to the reduced sample 
size of the going concern opinion samples, Equations (4a) and (4b) are not estimated for each filing type.  
In conclusion, the large audit firm results specify that the competitive distance between large audit firms and the competitive 
distance between a large audit firm and its nearest small audit firm competitor are not related to audit quality as measured by abnormal 
accruals, restatements, and going concern opinions. For the small audit firms, most of the tests find that audit quality is not associated 
with competitive distance between small audit firms and competitive distance between a small audit firm and its nearest large audit 
firm competitor. However, the exception is that among small audit firms, weak evidence exists that competitive distance is negatively 
related to abnormal accruals and restatements.  Overall, these results are interesting because they demonstrate that audit market  
  
Table 6 
Local-Industry Going Concern Opinion Samples 
 Dependent Variable: GC 
  Predicted Sign Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
     Coeff.   P-Value  Coeff.    P-Value 
INTERCEPT  -4.183 (0.010) ** -2.993
* (0.094) * 
























HERF +/- -0.177 (0.863)  -0.449 (0.602)  
SIZE - -0.830 (0.000) *** -0.441
*** (0.000) *** 
MB + 0.023 (0.112)  0.004 (0.763)  
DEBT + 1.561 (0.000) *** 1.824
*** (0.000) *** 
LOSS_GC + 1.431 (0.004) *** 0.952
** (0.027) ** 
L_LOSS_GC + 1.310 (0.000) *** 0.687
** (0.028) ** 
STD_SALE + -0.246 (0.772)  -1.113 (0.110)  
        



















competition may not be as big of a concern as previously thought. Audit market competition does not incentivize higher audit quality  
or force auditors to compromise audit quality.  
 
  
  Predicted Sign Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
     Coeff.   P-Value  Coeff.    P-Value 
Z_SCORE - -0.086 (0.000) *** -0.072
*** (0.001) *** 
CASH - -1.678 (0.000) *** -1.372
*** (0.008) *** 




L_GC + 2.211 (0.000) *** 2.259
*** (0.000) *** 
REPORT_LAG + 0.032 (0.000) *** 0.017
*** (0.009) *** 
L_RETURN - -0.291 (0.255) 
 
-0.908*** (0.000) *** 
STD_RET + 1.654 (0.113) 
 
1.863* (0.086) * 
TENURE +/- -0.268 (0.171) 
 
-0.356*** (0.010) ** 








Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
N  3,432 1,780 
In this table, a logistic regression is used to test if a relationship exists between going concern issuances and 
competitive distances. The dependent variable is GC. The variables of interest are competitive distances 
(B4_TO_B4, B4_TO_NB4, NB4_TO_NB4, and NB4_TO_B4). The sample period is restricted to financially 
distressed firms and covers the years 2004 through 2015.  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on Wald Chi-squares using robust standard errors, clustered by 
company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL TESTS AND SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
5.1 Competitive Distances at a Local Level 
 
 Section 4 discusses the results where competitive distance is measured at a local-industry level (two-digit SIC, MSA). In this 
section, competitive distance is measured at a local level (MSA). A local level measure is a broader measure than the local-industry 
measure because the local-industry measure is restrictive and significantly reduces the amount of observations that can be used. The 
local level holds industry effects constant. Additionally, Numan and Willekens (2012) cite that it is possible for some small audit firms 
to compete with large audit firms at the local level for clients. A disadvantage of this measure is that it is less reliable since most audit 
firms specialize within an industry (Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010).  
At a local level, B4_TO_B4_MSA (NB4_TO_NB4_MSA) is the smallest absolute market share difference between company i’s Big 4 
(non-Big 4) auditor and its closest Big 4 (non-Big 4) audit firm competitor within an MSA in a year. Similarly, at a local level, 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA (NB4_TO_B4_MSA) is defined as the smallest market share difference between company i's Big 4 (non-Big 4) 
auditor and its closest non-Big 4 (Big 4) audit firm competitor in an MSA in a year. 
  Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (audit quality measures) and the variables of interest 
(local competitive distances). The descriptive statistics for the audit quality proxies are similar to the values reported in Table 2, 
except that abnormal accruals at the local level are slightly lower than the values reported at the local-industry level. In the large audit 
firm samples, the mean for B4_TO_B4_MSA ranges from 0.092 to 0.099, and the mean for B4_TO_NB4_MSA ranges from 0.247 to 
0.253. For the small audit firm sample, the mean for NB4_TO_NB4_MSA is between 0.008 to 0.010, and NB4_TO_B4_MSA is 
between 0.104 and 0.112. These local competitive distance means are lower than the local-industry values because more clients are 
available and more audit firms are competing for market share at a local level than at a local-industry level.  
Table 7  
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Local Abnormal Accruals Samples 
  Large Audit Firm Sample (N=19,685)   Small Audit Firm Sample (N=6,084) 
















ABS_DACC_SIZE 0.056 0.059 0.017 0.038 0.074 
 
0.078 0.074 0.026 0.056 0.106 
B4_TO_B4_MSA 0.099 0.122 0.025 0.054 0.116  - - - - - 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA 0.253 0.144 0.157 0.229 0.322 
 
- - - - - 
NB4_TO_NB4_MSA - - - - -  0.008 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.008 
NB4_TO_B4_MSA - - - - - 
 
0.104 0.061 0.062 0.102 0.145 
            





Panel B: Local Restatement Samples 
  Large Audit Firm Sample (N=16,738)   Small Audit Firm Sample (N=8,773) 
















RESTATE 0.113 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIG_R 0.052 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.057 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LITTLE_R 0.061 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.032 0.176 0.000 0.000 0.000 
B4_TO_B4_MSA 0.097 0.121 0.024 0.052 0.112  - - - - - 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA 0.251 0.142 0.157 0.230 0.318 
 
- - - - - 
NB4_TO_NB4_MSA - - - - -  0.008 0.028 0.000 0.001 0.005 
NB4_TO_B4_MSA - - - - - 
 
0.112 0.092 0.067 0.104 0.145 
                        
                        
Panel C: Local Going Concern Opinion Samples 
  Large Audit Firm Sample (N=4,981)   Small Audit Firm Sample (N=2,952) 
















GC 0.058 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.113 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.000 
B4_TO_B4_MSA 0.092 0.114 0.024 0.051 0.106   - - - - - 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA 0.247 0.133 0.160 0.231 0.316   - - - - - 
NB4_TO_NB4_MSA - - - - -   0.010 0.024 0.000 0.002 0.008 
NB4_TO_B4_MSA - - - - -   0.108 0.077 0.064 0.103 0.147 
            
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Tables 8-10 regress Equations (2a) through (4b); however, the competitive distances and the Herfindahl index are measured 
at the local level. For abnormal accruals, both B4_TO_B4_MSA and B4_TO_NB4_MSA are statistically significant for the large 
audit sample. B4_TO_B4_MSA is negative and significant at p < 0.01. This result demonstrates that as local competitive distance 
decreases between two large audit firms, the abnormal accruals increase. In contrast, B4_TO_NB4_MSA loads positive and 
significant at p < 0.05. This outcome implies that decreasing competitive distance between large and small audit firms (more 
competition) is associated with lower abnormal accruals (better audit quality) as supported by Boone et al. (2012). 
The small audit firm sample results for abnormal accruals are also displayed in Table 8. NB4_TO_NB4_MSA and 
NB4_TO_B4_MSA have negative coefficients; however, neither loads significantly suggesting that competitive distances at the MSA 
level in the small audit market are not associated with the absolute value of abnormal accruals.  
Table 9 displays the logistic regression results for the restatement samples. B4_TO_B4_MSA is not significant, but 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA is positive and significant at p < 0.05. This result indicates that as competitive distance decreases, the likelihood 






Local Abnormal Accruals Samples 




Large Sample Small Sample 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
    Coeff.      P-Value   Coeff.     P-Value 
INTERCEPT  0.060 (0.000) *** 0.105 (0.000) *** 
B4_TO_B4_MSA +/- -0.015 (0.003) *** - - 
 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA +/- 0.010 (0.032) ** - - 
 




















SIZE - -0.003 (0.000) *** -0.004 (0.000) *** 
LEV - -0.008 (0.027) ** -0.012 (0.066) * 
CFO + 0.016 (0.054) * -0.055 (0.000) *** 
STD_CFO - 0.204 (0.000) *** 0.087 (0.000) *** 
MB + 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.003) *** 
LOSS + 0.007 (0.000) *** -0.009 (0.001) *** 
ABS_LTA + 0.058 (0.000) *** 0.061 (0.000) *** 
Z_SCORE - -0.002 (0.000) *** -0.001 (0.022) ** 
LIT + 0.011 (0.000) *** 0.005 (0.148) 
 












TIER_2 - - - 
 
-0.006 (0.015) ** 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
 Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.2288 0.1517 
N  19,685 6,084 
In this table, an OLS regression is used to test if a relationship exists between the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals and competitive distances measured at a local level. The dependent variable is the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE), and the variables of interest are competitive distances (B4_TO_B4_MSA, 
B4_TO_NB4_MSA, NB4_TO_NB4_MSA, and NB4_TO_B4_MSA). The sample period is 2004-2015.  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on t-statistics using robust standard errors, clustered by company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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 (lower likelihood of restatements).  For the small audit firm sample, NB4_TO_NB4_MSA and NB4_TO_B4_MSA are not 
















Table 9  
Panel A: Local Restatement Samples 




Large Sample Small Sample 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
  Coeff.   P-Value Coeff.   P-Value 
INTERCEPT  -2.292 (0.000) *** -2.964 (0.000) *** 




B4_TO_NB4_MSA +/- 0.721 (0.021) ** - - 
 
















HERF_MSA +/- -0.033 (0.237) 
 
0.050 (0.081) * 
SIZE - -0.026 (0.283) 
 
0.081 (0.018) ** 
LEV + 0.272 (0.085) * 0.022 (0.794) 
 
LOSS +/- 0.066 (0.492) 
 
0.174 (0.092) * 
MB + -0.003 (0.671) 
 
-0.004 (0.055) * 




LOG_SEG + 0.185 (0.097) * 0.184 (0.264) 
 
FOREIGN + 0.031 (0.678) 
 
-0.348 (0.005) *** 
MERGER + 0.263 (0.000) *** 0.368 (0.001) *** 




FIN + 0.365 (0.009) *** 0.017 (0.713) 
 
EPR + 0.421 (0.068) * -0.054 (0.387) 
 
FREEC + 0.592 (0.038) ** -0.028 (0.052) * 
MAT_WEAK + 1.182 (0.000) *** 0.978 (0.000) *** 








GC +/- -0.339 (0.167) 
 
-0.285 (0.033) ** 




AB_FEE +/- -0.113 (0.074) * -0.307 (0.000) *** 
LRESTATE + 3.513 (0.000) *** 2.888 (0.000) *** 




Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
N  16,738 8,773 
In this table, a logistic regression is used to test if a relationship exists between restatements and 
competitive distances measured at a local level. The dependent variable is RESTATE. The variables of 
interest are competitive distances (B4_TO_B4_MSA, B4_TO_NB4_MSA, NB4_TO_NB4_MSA, and 
NB4_TO_B4_MSA). The sample period is restricted to 2004-2013.  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on Wald Chi-squares using robust standard errors, 
clustered by company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 10 reports the logistic regression results for the going concern opinion samples. For both the large and small audit firm 
samples, none of the competitive distances (B4_TO_B4_MSA, B4_TO_NB4_MSA, NB4_TO_NB4_MSA, and NB4_TO_B4_MSA) 
Table 10 
Local Going Concern Opinion Samples 
 Dependent Variable: GC 
  Predicted Sign Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
   Coeff.   P-Value Coeff.  P-Value 
INTERCEPT  -2.453 (0.019) ** -5.520 (0.010) ** 




























SIZE - -0.690 (0.000) *** -0.494 (0.000) *** 




DEBT + 1.527 (0.000) *** 1.584 (0.000) *** 
LOSS_GC + 0.820 (0.003) *** 1.063 (0.006) *** 
L_LOSS_GC + 0.775 (0.002) *** 0.680 (0.008) *** 
STD_SALE + -0.188 (0.781) 
 
-1.181 (0.037) ** 
Z_SCORE - -0.135 (0.000) *** -0.073 (0.000) *** 
CASH - -1.650 (0.000) *** -1.020 (0.027) ** 




L_GC + 2.311 (0.000) *** 2.586 (0.000) *** 
REPORT_LAG + 0.028 (0.000) *** 0.026 (0.000) *** 
L_RETURN - -0.473 (0.024) ** -0.492 (0.029) ** 
STD_RET + 2.082 (0.014) ** 1.285 (0.162) 
 




AB_FEE +/- -0.060 (0.747) 
 
-0.183 (0.282)   
TIER_2 + - - 
 
-0.140 (0.583)   
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  
N  4,981 2,952 
In this table, a logistic regression is used to test if a relationship exists between going concern issuances and competitive 
distances measured at a local level. The dependent variable is GC. The variables of interest are competitive distances 
(B4_TO_B4_MSA, B4_TO_NB4_MSA, NB4_TO_NB4_MSA, and NB4_TO_B4_MSA). The sample period is 
restricted to financially distressed firms and covers the years 2004 through 2015. 
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. 
Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on Wald Chi-squares using robust standard errors, clustered by company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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load significantly. Overall, these results indicate that local competitive distances in the large and small audit firm markets are not 
associated with the likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion.   
In conclusion, with these additional tests, some evidence provides that local competitive distance may influence audit quality 
for abnormal accruals and restatements; however, readers should take caution when interpreting these results due to the nature of 
measuring competitive distances at a local level without regard to industry.  
5.2 Autocorrelation  
Autocorrelation is the similarity between observations as a function of the time lag between them. One way to account for 
autocorrelation is to include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable on the right-hand side of the equation.  If the 
lagged dependent variable is not included as a control variable, then it is possible to have unreliable results due to omitted variable 
bias. If the lagged dependent variable is included, then it is expected that its current value is to be explained heavily by its past values. 
An issue with including the lagged dependent variable in the model is that it will likely make the independent variable coefficients 
smaller and the standard errors larger. For the restatement and going concern tests, lagged restatements and lagged going concern 
opinions are already included as control variables (See Tables 5 and 6 and Tables 9 and 10).  
For the abnormal accrual samples, an autocorrelation test created by Wooldridge (2002) is used to test if autocorrelation is 
present in the models. The results indicate that autocorrelation is present in both the large and small audit firm abnormal accrual 
models (p < 0.01) (untabulated). Table 11 shows the results of Equations (2a) and (2b) with lagged absolute value of abnormal 
accruals as a control variable. The results for the large audit firm sample remain unchanged with neither competitive distance loading 
significantly. For the small audit firm sample, NB4_TO_NB4 is negative and significant (p < 0.05) similar to Table 4, and now, 













Local-Industry Abnormal Accruals Samples 
Sensitivity Test 
Dependent Variable: ABS_DACC_SIZE 
  Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
 Coeff. P-Value  Coeff.      P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.032 (0.000) *** 0.155 (0.000) *** 
L_ABS_DACC_SIZE 0.262 (0.000) *** 0.131 (0.000) *** 








NB4_TO_NB4 - - 
 
-0.050 (0.037) ** 
NB4_TO_B4 - - 
 
0.017 (0.016) ** 




       











































5.3 Research Design Sensitivity Tests 
In their paper, Eshleman and Lawson (2017) provide evidence of a positive relationship between audit market concentration 
and audit quality. Specifically, they find that higher audit market concentration, as proxied by the Herfindahl index, is associated with 
lower absolute value of abnormal accruals. In other words, less competition is linked to higher audit quality. In their design, they rank 
the Herfindahl index by quintiles and run their regression on the full sample, the non-switching audit client sample, the switching audit 
client sample, the first-year engagements with low-balling, and the first-year engagements with no lowballing. Their results of a 
positive association between audit market concentration and audit quality hold in the full, the non-switching, and the first-year 
engagement with no lowballing samples. To see if the results of this paper are sensitive to design choices, the methodology of 
Eshleman and Lawson (2017) are followed for the absolute value of abnormal accrual regressions in Table 12. Equations (2a) and (2b) 
  Large Sample Small Sample 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
 Coeff. P-Value  Coeff.      P-Value 




HERF -0.001 (0.931) 
 
-0.018 (0.071) * 
SIZE -0.002 (0.000) *** -0.003 (0.002) *** 
LEV -0.009 (0.068) ** -0.003 (0.803) 
 
CFO 0.025 (0.040) ** -0.034 (0.074) * 
STD_CFO 0.134 (0.000) *** 0.076 (0.000) *** 
MB 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.063) * 
LOSS 0.011 (0.000) *** -0.007 (0.099) * 
ABS_LTA -0.033 (0.016) ** 0.040 (0.049) ** 
Z_SCORE -0.003 (0.000) *** -0.001 (0.012) ** 
LIT 0.011 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.821) 
 
















Industry and Year  Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.2681 0.1703 
N 8,880 3,432 
In this table, an OLS regression is used to test if a relationship exists between the absolute value 
of abnormal accruals and competitive distances while controlling for autocorrelation. The 
dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE), and the 
variables of interest are competitive distances (B4_TO_B4, B4_TO_NB4, NB4_TO_NB4, and 
NB4_TO_B4). The sample period is 2004-2015.  
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. Coefficient p-values are two-
tailed and based on t-statistics using robust standard errors, clustered by company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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are presented; however, the competitive distances are ranked in quintiles, and the samples are broken down into 5 different groups, 
following Eshleman and Lawson (2017).  
Table 12: Panel A displays the results for the absolute value of abnormal accruals large audit market sample. B4_TO_B4RANK 
and B4_TO_NB4RANK do not load significantly for both the pooled sample and non-switching sample. For first-year engagements, 
B4_TO_NB4RANK does not load significantly in any of the samples, and B4_TO_B4RANK loads negative and weakly significant (p < 
0.10). However, when first-year engagements are split between lowballing and no lowballing, B4_TO_B4RANK is positive and 
significant when it is a first-year engagement with lowballing (discounting) of audit fees. This positive coefficient signifies that as 
competitive distance increases (less competition), the absolute value of abnormal accruals also increases.  
Panel B of Table 12 presents the regression results for the small audit firm sample for the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals. NB4_TO_B4RANK is not significant for any of the regression variations. NB4_TO_NB4RANK is negative and significant for 
the pooled sample and the non-switching sample. This negative coefficient suggests that as a small audit firm decreases its competitive 
distance from other small audit firms (lower ranking of competitive distance), the absolute value of abnormal accruals increases 
(lower audit quality). In conclusion, Table 12 demonstrates that the setting (switching, non-switching, not lowballing, and lowballing) 















































Table 12  
Local-Industry Abnormal Accruals Samples 
 Dependent Variable: ABS_DACC_SIZE 




                                              Switching Samples 
    Switching Full             No Lowball Yes Lowball 
      Coeff.      P-Value                 Coeff.      P-Value  Coeff.      P-Value          Coeff.    P-Value     Coeff.    P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.048 (0.000) *** 0.051 (0.000) *** -0.059 (0.087) * -0.121 (0.086)  * 0.014 (0.787) 
 




-0.005  (0.084)      *   -0.006 (0.268)   - 0.010 (0.042) ** 




-0.000  (0.888)        -0.001 (0.837)  0.005 (0.314)  




0.003 (0.744)           0.016 (0.372) 
 
-0.013  (0.263) 
 














LEV -0.009 (0.065) 
 






CFO 0.026 (0.014) ** 0.030 (0.017) ** 0.049 (0.326)  0.061 (0.495)  0.021 (0.650)  
STD_CFO 0.159 (0.000) *** 0.150 (0.000) *** 0.186 (0.002) *** 0.189 (0.018) ** 0.172 (0.011) ** 
MB 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.000) *** 0.001 (0.439) 
 
0.004 (0.092) * -0.000 (0.967) 
 
LOSS 0.010 (0.000) *** 0.011 (0.000) *** 0.024 (0.019) ** 0.037 (0.097) * 0.008 (0.468) 
 






Z_SCORE -0.003 (0.000) *** -0.004 (0.000) *** -0.000 (0.969) 
 
0.004 (0.448)   -0.001 (0.698) 
 
LIT 0.012 (0.000) *** 0.015 (0.000) *** 0.018 (0.085) * 0.011 (0.546)   0.013 (0.327) 
 






        - - 
 
-       - 
 
AB_FEE -0.001 (0.609) 
 
-0.004 (0.019) ** -0.001 (0.847)   0.007 (0.534)   -0.006 (0.398) 
 
MAT_WEAK 0.003 (0.100)   0.003 (0.234) 
 
-0.004 (0.603)   0.003 (0.845)   -0.006 (0.587) 
 
Industry and Year 
Fixed Effects 
                 Yes 
  
Yes   Yes  
 




      
R-squared               0.2335              0.2454            0.3307                   0.4030 0.4081  
  
 
                          
N               11,302               7,956              350                     169 169 
      





Panel B: Small Sample 
 
             Pooled      Non-Switching 
                                                 Switching Samples 
    Switching Full          No Lowball Yes Lowball 
      Coeff.      P-Value                 Coeff.      P-Value  Coeff.      P-Value       Coeff.   P-Value  Coeff.   P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.153 (0.000) *** 0.259 (0.000) *** 0.091 (0.013)  **       0.105 (0.032) ** 0.065 (0.233) 
 
NB4_TO_NB4RANK -0.003 (0.010) ** -0.008 (0.005) *** -0.003 (0.230)           -0.002 (0.672)  --0.004 (0 (0.267)   




 0.002 (0.537)       0.003 (0.397)  0.000 (0.975)  




-0.009 (0.595)        -0.045 (0.019) ** 0.025 (0.360) 
 






























CFO -0.064 (0.000) *** -0.090 (0.019) ** -0.035 (0.248)  -0.014 (0.759)  -0.063 (0.138)  
STD_CFO 0.054 (0.000) *** 0.025 (0.146) 
 
0.080 (0.000) *** 0.081 (0.018) ** 0.074 (0.004) *** 














-0.004 (0.802)   -0.016 (0.234) 
 








Z_SCORE -0.002 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.083) * -0.002 (0.053) * -0.003 (0.117)   -0.002 (0.248) 
 






0.012 (0.480)   -0.014 (0.264) 
 




      -       - 
 
      -       - 
 
      -       - 
 






-0.014 (0.165)   -0.005 (0.621) 
 
MAT_WEAK 0.008 (0.029)  ** 0.006 (0.535) 
 
0.018 (0.030) ** 0.013 (0.300)   0.024 (0.034) ** 
TIER_2 -0.004 (0.201)  -0.003 (0.708)  -0.002 (0.845)  -0.008 (0.539)  0.006 (0.595)  
Industry and Year 
Fixed Effects 






                 Yes  
  
 
 Yes  
      
R-squared               0.1770          0.2540 0.2068                0.2262  0.2603  
                          
N                4,758             676 829                  415  414 
In this table, an OLS regression is used to test if a relationship exists between the absolute value of abnormal accruals and ranked competitive distances. The 
dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_DACC_SIZE), and the variables of interest are competitive distances (B4_TO_B4 RANK, 
B4_TO_NB4 RANK, NB4_TO_NB4 RANK, and NB4_TO_B4 RANK). The sample period is 2004-2015. For both the large and small audit firm samples, the model is 
run on the entire large(small) sample and then restricted to the non-switching observations, the switching observations, the no lowball switching observations, and 
the lowball switching observations. 
Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. 
***,**,* Denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively. Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on t-statistics using robust standard errors, clustered 
by company. 
P-values are shown in parentheses. 
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5.4 Research Design Sensitivity Tests (untabulated) 
 To test if the results are sensitive to the audit quality proxy choice, additional OLS regressions are run using accrual quality 
as the proxy for audit quality. Accrual quality captures how well working capital accruals map into past, present, and future operating 
cash flows (Dechow and Dichev 2002). For this test, accrual quality is regressed on competitive distances (B4_TO_B4, B4_TO_NB4, 
NB4_TO_NB4, and NB4_TO_B4) and a set of control variables. Accrual quality is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals 
from year t through year t-4 from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality measure, as adjusted by McNichols (2002). A 
higher standard deviation signifies poorer accrual quality as well as poorer audit quality. The results of these tests (untabulated) are 
not conclusive except for the small sample results. The small sample accrual quality results support the main small sample abnormal 
accrual results that competitive distance is negatively related to audit quality.  
 Another test is done to examine if the main results are sensitive to the continuous nature of the competitive distance 
variables.  For this sensitivity test, the main models (Table 4: Panel A, Table 5: Panel A, and Table 6: Panel A) are re-run except the 
competitive distance variables are replaced by ranked competitive distance variables (terciles, quartiles, quintiles, and deciles). The 
competitive distance variables are ranked by year. The results (untabulated) are similar to the results found in the main results. 
 Lastly, the Herfindahl index is a concentration control variable that is used in all the models; however, it is highly correlated 
with some of the competitive distance variables of interest, B4_TO_B4 and NB4_TO_B4. Competitive distance and the Herfindahl 
index both rely on market share to calculate their values. Therefore, for this sensitivity test, the Herfindahl index is re-calculated based 
on client count (Boone et al. 2012), and the main models (Table 4: Panel A, Table 5: Panel A, and Table 6: Panel A) are re-run to 
examine if the models are sensitive to Herfindahl index specifications (untabulated). The results remain the same regardless of how 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the relationship between audit quality and competitive distance within and between the large and small 
audit markets. Prior literature has found mixed results when proxying competition with concentration measures such as the Herfindahl 
index. Recently, papers researching audit market competition have used competitive distance to capture competition. Competitive 
distance is founded in spatial economics and is based on a firm’s relative location in a market. It is calculated as the absolute smallest 
difference in market shares between two competitors. Competitive distance is captured within the large audit market, within the small 
audit market, and between the large and small audit markets.  
Most of the results indicate that local-industry competition between large audit firms, between small audit firms, and between 
large and small audit firms is not associated with audit quality as proxied by abnormal accruals, restatements, Big R, Little r, and 
going concern opinions. The small audit firm sample provides some evidence that local-industry competitive distance between two 
small audit firms is associated with abnormal accruals and restatements when a client is a non-accelerated filer.  
In the additional tests section, competitive distance is measured at a local level. These tests provide some evidence that local 
competition affects audit quality. Specifically, the results show that for abnormal accruals, decreasing local competitive distance 
between large audit firms is linked with higher abnormal accruals. In contrast, decreasing local competitive distance between a large 
audit firm and its nearest small audit firm competitor is associated with lower abnormal accruals and a lower likelihood of a 
restatement.  
A limitation of this study is endogeneity related to the direction of causality between competitive distances and the proxies 
for audit quality. Does lower competitive distances (more competition) lead to higher abnormal accruals, more restatements, and fewer 
going concern opinions? Or, do these demands for poorer financial reporting quality lead to more competition between auditors, as 
clients demand cheaper audits? It is not possible to completely disentangle these effects, and readers should exercise caution when 
interpreting the outcomes.   
Overall, competition has been a concern for regulators. Regulators fear that highly concentrated markets and not enough 
competition cause auditors to become complacent and not offer high quality audits. This paper provides insight into the dynamics of 
audit quality and competition within the large audit market, competition within the small audit market, and competition between these 
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ABS_DACC_SIZE Absolute value of abnormal accruals for company i using performance-adjusted 
abnormal accruals model based on the cross-sectional modified Jones equation (Jones 
1991, Kothari et al. 2005). The model is run by size-year deciles and requires at least 11 
observations per group, following the methodology of Ecker et al. (2013). 
RESTATE Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has restated their financial statements in year 
t, and 0 otherwise. 
BIG_R Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has restated their financial statements in year t 
and announced it in an 8-K filing or Press Release, and 0 otherwise.  
LITTLE_R Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has restated their financial statements in year t 
and announced it in the 10-K filing, and 0 otherwise. 
GC Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i received a going-concern report in year t, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
Variables of Interest 
Variables Definition 
B4_TO_B4 The smallest absolute industry market share difference between company i's Big 4 
auditor and its closest Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA.  
B4_TO_B4RANK Ranking of B4_TO_B4 into quintiles per year. 
B4_TO_NB4 The smallest absolute industry market share difference between company i's Big 4 
auditor and its closest non-Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA.  
B4_TO_NB4RANK Ranking of B4_TO_NB4 into quintiles per year. 
NB4_TO_B4 The smallest absolute industry market share difference between company i's non-Big 
4 auditor and its closest Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA. 
NB4_TO_B4RANK Ranking of NB4_TO_B4 into quintiles per year. 
NB4_TO_NB4 The smallest absolute industry market share difference between company i's non-Big 
4 auditor and its closest non-Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA. 
NB4_TO_NB4RANK Ranking of NB4_TO_NB4 into quintiles per year. 
B4_TO_B4_MSA The smallest absolute market share difference between company i's Big 4 auditor and 
its closest Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA.  
B4_TO_NB4_MSA The smallest absolute market share difference between company i's Big 4 auditor and 
its closest non-Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA.  
NB4_TO_B4_MSA The smallest absolute market share difference between company i's non-Big 4 auditor 
and its closest Big 4 audit firm competitor in an MSA. 
NB4_TO_NB4_MSA The smallest absolute market share difference between company i's non-Big 4 auditor 





ABS_LTA Absolute value of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets of company i.  
AB_FEE The residual from the following audit fee model:  
AUDIT_FEES= +β0 +X’β  +Industry and Year fixed effectsi,t +ɛi,t  ; 
X is a vector of control variables common to fee models such as client size, 
current assets, accounts receivable inventory turnover, return on asset, loss 
indicator, foreign operations indicator, merger indicator, busy year end 
indicator, leverage, intangibles, log of business segments, going concern 
indicator, and material weakness indicator.   
ACC_FILER Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i is an accelerated filer, and 0 
otherwise. 
ARINV The sum of company i's accounts receivable and inventory, divided by total 
assets.  
CASH Sum of company i's total cash and investment securities divided by total assets. 








CLIENT_IMPORTANCE Audit fees for company i divided by the sum of all audit fees reported in Audit 
Analytics for the same audit firm office in year t 
DEBT Total liabilities divided by total assets for company i 
EPR Company i's income from continuing operations divided by market 
capitalization. 
FIN The sum of company i's additional cash raised from issuance of long-term debt, 
common stock, and preferred stock; scaled by total assets. 
FIRM_SIZE The natural log of the number of publicly traded clients audited by company i’s 
audit firm office during year t. 
FOREIGN An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has income from foreign 
operations, and 0 otherwise. 
FREEC The sum of company i’s cash from operations less average capital expenditures 
of the current and prior years scaled by lagged total assets. 
HERF The industry Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared industry market 
shares (in audit fees) of all local audit offices in an MSA.  
HERF_MSA The Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared market shares (in audit 
fees) of all audit offices in an MSA.  
JOINT_SPEC Indicator variable equal to 1 if an audit firm has at least a 30% market share at 
the local level (2 digit SIC, MSA) and at least a 30% market share at the 
national level (2 digit SIC), and 0 otherwise. Market share is based on audit fees.  
L_GC Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i received a going-concern report in 
year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
L_LOSS_GC An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has negative income from 
operations after deprecation in year t-1.  
L_RETURN Company i’s previous 12-month stock returns. 
LARGE_ACC_FILER Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i is a large accelerated filer, and 0 
otherwise. 
LRESTATE Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has restated their financial statements 
in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
LEV Leverage of company i, defined as long-term debt divided by assets. 
LIT Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i operates in a high litigation industry 
(SIC 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370), and 0 
otherwise. 
LOG_SEG The natural log of 1 plus the number of business segments of company i. 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has net income < 0, and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS_GC An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has negative income from 
operations after depreciation in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
MAT_WEAK Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has an internal control weakness, and 
0 otherwise. 
MB The market-to-book ratio of company i, defined as market value of equity 
divided by book value. 
MERGER Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i had a merger or acquisition in year t, 
and 0 otherwise.  
NON_ACC_FILER Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i is a non-accelerated filer, and 0 
otherwise. 
REPORT_LAG Number of days between company i's fiscal year-end and its earnings 
announcement date. 
ROA Return on assets for company i in year t. Net income for company i in year t 
divided by company i's assets in year t.  
SIZE Log of total assets for company i.  
SPEC Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i has an auditor that has at least a 30% 
market share in a 2 digit SIC, MSA per year, and 0 otherwise. 
STD_CFO Standard deviation of operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets of 
company i for year t through year t-2.   
  




STD_RET Company i's stock volatility and is the standard deviation of 12 monthly stock 
returns for year t. 
STD_SALE Standard deviation of sales scaled by lagged total assets of company i for year t 
through year t-2.  
TENURE The natural logarithm of (the number of years that the auditor has audited 
company i's financial statements). 
TIER_2 Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i is audited by a second tier firm, and 0 
otherwise. Second tier is defined as non-Big 4 firms that are inspected annually 
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  
Z_SCORE Altman’s score for company i, measures the likelihood of company survival. 
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